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Abstract
This thesis concerns itself with the effects of factor mobility on the economic
development of geographically distinct regions.
In Chapter 1, it is shown with a simple model of endogenous growth that brain drain
leads to divergence of growth rates. But if return migration is introduced as a source
of technology diffusion, a trade-off between brain drain and technology gain arises.
Return migration leads to convergence of economic development, if the cost of
remaining in the foreign country are relatively high and the transferability of
technology is good. This is, because then returnees bring not only along the new
technology but also high talent.
In a model, where a less developed country imports high quality products and
produces low quality products, there might be a trade off between imports and foreign
engagement in technology transfer to the local industry. Chapter 2 shows under which
conditions a tariff induces technology transfer. Two cases are considered: market
integration and market segmentation in prices. In both cases there exists a tariff that
induces technology transfer to the low-quality firm. The positive welfare effect of the
quality upgrade is more pronounced in the second case, however, because the tariff
induces a reduction in the high-quality firm's price in addition to the improvement of
the local quality.
A spatial model of foreign direct investment (FDI) is analysed in Chapter 3. In that
framework the distance between production locations increases with the size of the
market covered and therefore with firm size. If a surprise-investment-location arises
close by, it attracts less investment than if it had been anticipated and mainly from
firms in the vicinity. We find empirical support for our model with German industry
survey data. Small investing firms go mainly to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
Medium sized firms are dissuaded from investing in CEE, if they have already
invested elsewhere. Big investing firms typically go to CEE and to the rest of the
world.
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Introduction
In recent developments of economic theory, the effect of factor mobility on economic
development depends critically on the precise assumptions. For both converging and
diverging effects theoretical support has been found.
A benchmark for the converging effect has been the competitive model of two
countries of equal level of technological development with the only two factors of
production, capital and labor (either Heckscher-Ohlin as in Venables, 1997, or Solow
as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995b, Chapter 3). Factors flow between the countries
until factor prices and relative factor endowments have equalized. This takes place
either through trade in goods only, imbedding the factors of production, and/or
through direct flow of at least one of the two factors.' In this case, factor mobility and
trade lead to a symmetric equilibrium. Income levels and factor prices converge and
economic activity is smoothed spatially across the two countries.
However, factor mobility leads to diverging effects in the two other most widely used
models of international trade, the specific-factors model (for instance in Neary, 1995)
and the Helpman-Krugman model (1985) of international monopolistic competition2.
Capital and labor can both flow to wealthier regions destabilizing the symmetric
equilibrium. The accumulation and mobility of human capital and technology studied
in models of endogenous growth, can reinforce these effects (Aghion and Howitt,
1998, Chapter 11 and Lucas, 1988). As a result, we observe diverging patterns of
economic development in some regions of the world (Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
Chapter 1).
Many aspects of factor mobility are yet unresolved, although the design of policies for
trade and integration between regions depends crucially on them. This thesis analyses
'In these models a country that is endowed relatively poorly with capital, has a higher marginal
productivity of capital. This leads to import of capital intensive goods or of the factor capital until the
marginal product has fallen to the level of the other country. At the same time the marginal product
of labor rises to the level of the other countly, as labor intensive goods and labor are exported.
2 See Venables (1997) for a detailed description of factor mobility in these models.
Trade theory conventionally takes technology as given, whereas groh theory investigates the
interaction of technological progress and factor mobility.
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some aspects of factor mobility, both in terms of structure as well as consequences.
Each chapter contains a theoretical formalization of a different issue of factor mobility
that is discussed informally in the context the economic transition and integration of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the Western economies. Although the models
presented here were motivated by the situation in CEE, they do not apply to CEE
only. Chapters 1 and 2 deal with technology transfer or the 'trade in ideas'. In
Chapter 1, migration and return migration function as vehicles for technology transfer,
in Chapter 2, a tariff policy is discussed that may induce technology transfer on firm
level. Chapter 3 investigates theoretically as well as empirically, which firms are most
likely to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE.
Within an exogenous growth model, the loss of human capital due to migration can be
offset by the migrants' failure to carry physical capital. But if the loss of human capital
influences the accumulation of technological progress endogenously, brain drain might
deteriorate the long run growth prospects for people staying behind in the country of
emigration. This is especially relevant for CEE. On the one hand, migratory pressure -
especially from the well educated - is high (Layard et al., 1992, and Strepetova,
1995). On the other hand, CEE is characterized by an almost obsolete stock of capital
and technology, but simultaneously a very high level of education (Gros and
Steinherr, 1995, Chapter 6). Even if the labor-capital ratio falls as a result of
migration, the capital stock alone is totally inadequate for a substantial improvement
of living conditions as well as for an enhancement of technological progress.
The deteriorating effect of brain drain has been recognized in the migration literature.
Many causes for the negative effects of human capital loss have been identified. One
of the earliest and most obvious being that public expenditure on education is lost as a
result of brain drain (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). Nevertheless, there are also
sources of 'brain gain' resulting from brain drain. Human capital accumulation might
be enhanced by the prospect of emigration (Mountford, 1997, and Stark et al., 1997).
Alternatively, return migration may be one of the sources of technology transfer
See also Baldwin and Venables (1994), Haque and Kim (1994), Kwok and Leland (1982),
Markusen (1988) and Miyagiwa (1991) for other examples of this mechanism in dynamic as well as
in static frameworks.
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(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995b, Chapter 8). The size and persistence of return
migration flows has always been substantial, which underlines the relevance of the
investigation of the effects of return migration on development and growth
(Dustmann, 1996).
In Chapter 1, a reduced-form endogenous growth model is used to illustrate the long
run effects of a loss of human capital on technological progress. But migration can
also be growth enhancing for a lagging economy. Due to return migration new, more
advanced knowledge, acquired abroad, is transferred back to the country. High cost
of staying abroad combined with high benefits of returning may lead to convergence
in growth rates, because the share of talented persons in the group of returnees
increases and moreover technology is transferred.
Chapter 2 turns to technology transfer on firm level. To date, the literature on
technology transfer on firm level only considers transfers that improve the
competitiveness of the local firm (Kabiraj and Marjit, 1998, and BlomstrOm and
Wang, 1992). Thus a technology improvement is unambiguously desirable for the
local firm.
The model of vertical product differentiation in Chapter 2 challenges this conclusion.
Technology transfers occur in the model, if the quality of the locally produced good is
improved by know-how that only a foreign firm can supply. 6 A firm may want to
produce low quality goods in order to maintain a maximum monopoly power (Shaked
and Sutton, 1983). Technology transfers that improve the local quality may therefore
not be attractive to that firm, even though their long-run effects are beneficial for the
economy as a whole due to the spillovers created by the technology transfers.
Government intervention in the form of a protective tariff can be welfare enhancing by
Kabiraj and Marjit (1998) come to the conclusion that a protective tariff induces technology
transfer to a less developed economy. In their model a local producer competes in quantities (Nash-
Cournot) 'ith an importer that has a production cost advantage. Only the importing competitor can
sell the cost-reducing technology to the local producer. There exists a tariff for which the importer's
profits are squeezed sufficiently much that the gain of selling the superior technology is larger than
the loss due to tougher competition. BlomstrOm and Wang (1992) focus on the effect of local
competition on the incentives of a multinational firm to realize a costly technology transfer. They
conclude that the local industiy should be made more competitive in order to make technology
transfer a necessity for the multinational firm.
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inducing quality improvement of local production, because of the cost advantage of
the local firm caused by the tariff.7 The model defines the conditions under which a
protective tariff leads to a quality improvement of locally produced goods.
In Chapter 3, we show that there might be reasons to believe that German FDI in
CEE is particularly conducted by small firms. In order to promote the catch-up of the
economies of CEE capital and technology need to be attracted (EBRD, 1998). FDI is
a source of both of these factors, but it has remained behind expectations in CEE
(EBRD, 1998). So far, Germany has taken the role of the most important single
investor and trade partner of CEE, being an economically large country in its direct
vicinity. About 30% of all FDI in CEE are by German firms (Hunya and Starkovski,
1998). However, German investments in CEE seem to follow a pattern where big
multinational firms invest relatively little in CEE whereas small and medium sized
firms are very active in that region (Hartel et al., 1995).
The model in Chapter 3 explains this investment pattern. Firms choose their
investment location along a line, supposedly before the iron curtain fell. With a distant
dependant fix cost of investment, small firms might not invest at all or invest in
locations close to the headquarters, whereas large firms optimally invest in far-off
locations, optimizing their global production structure. If an unexpected new
investment location appears on the line after firms have taken their initial investment
decisions - for example the opening of CEE - investments in that location may be
primarily by small firms. This is due to the fact that the conditions in the direct vicinity
of small firms have changed dramatically, whereas the change is irelatively modest in
global terms, hence not affecting the globally optimized production structure of large
firms. The model is tested with German industry survey data of the year 1995.
Investment patterns do follow the model's prediction in a robust way, even if we
control for sectoral effects in a binomial or a multinomial regressions.
This lends itself to the conclusion that CEE is an attractive investment location mainly
for small German firms that have not yet invested elsewhere. On the one hand, they
'TecO1O stands for production technologies as well as modern management skills.
This business stealing effect is described in (Jeanneret and Verdier 1996).
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face lower cost of investment due to actual and cultural closeness of CEE. On the
other hand, larger German firms, that have more experience in investing abroad,
prefer other locations, because CEE is relatively expensive compared to far-off
developing countries and can easily be served from other locations.' If income in CEE
rises steadily over time, this situation might persist, even if the investment
environment improves.
CEE is considered a relatively expensive investment location because infrastructure and the
political situation present high risks, even though actual cost of production are still rather low
(Janssens and Konings, 1996)
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1. Brain Drain and Technology Gain: The Effect of
Human Capital Mobility on Growth
1.1.	 Introduction
With large migratory pressure from the former communist countries, the issue of brain
drain and its effects on the development of the source countries has arisen again. If
individuals differ in their level of human capital and the incentives to migrate are more
pronounced for the more educated, the ensuing brain drain might hamper economic
development and cause a poverty trap. On the contrary, migration and even brain
drain may, also foster development by technological catch-up via return migration.
The present chapter formalizes these two effects in a simple growth model, and
presents the trade-offs. In doing so it combines - and at the same time challenges -
findings from three different strands of the literature: brain drain, return migration and
endogenous economic growth.
Brain drain refers to the emigration of the relatively productive people from less
developed to more advanced economies. Productivity can differ by inherent skills, by
acquired education or simply by age. The appearance of brain drain is explained
through a combination of higher returns relative to skills abroad and migration cost
that may decrease relative to the skill level of an individual. In Russia, for instance, in
1993 out of 114,133 permanent emigrants 67,775 had a high level education, that is
almost 60% (Strepetova, 1995).
In the earlier economic literature the consensus was that brain drain, even if small, is
detrimental to the source economy, if some externality is connected to human capital
(e.g., Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). The externality can be generated by tax/subsidy
distortions. But the education sector can also exhibit economies of scale in skills in
form of spillovers (Miyagiwa, 1991) or the economic activity of the highly skilled can
generate positive spillovers to the rest of the economy (Markusen, 1988). In both of
these cases a "smaller" countries offer less return to skill and hence risk to lose part of
the skilled workforce. This leads to output losses for all agents in the source
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country even in the absence of dynamic effects.
The more recent literature focuses on the potential of a "home-made" brain gain as a
result of migration. The prospect of emigration increases incentives to accumulate
human capital. This leads to brain gain instead of drain, if the actual loss of human
capital due to migration is smaller than the skill formation gain caused by potential
outflow. Either emigration restrictions (Mountford, 1997) or return migration (Stark
et al., 1997) of emigrants (educated in the source country) may reduce the actual
outflow of skilled labor. It remains an empirically question, whether potential
emigration can increase incentives for skill formation in the source country sufficiently
to initiate positive development effects.
Another source of a gain from migration is return migration of foreign-trained
individuals. It is one of three sources of technology diffusion and economic catch-up,
the two others being trade and PD! (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995b, Chapter 8).
Migration waves are always followed by return migration, of varying size. This is
either because the host country imposes this on the immigrants or because they return
deliberately. Between 30-50% of European immigrants to the US returned in the early
twentieth century and Western Europe has shown substantial return flows in the
seventies and eighties (Dustman, 1996). Not surprisingly, return migration seems to
rise with falling transport cost and rising job uncertainty in the host country (Baines,
1991, in Dustmann, 1994).
The existing theoretical literature explains deliberate return migration by asymmetric
information or risk diversification under uncertainty. 9 Adverse selection of return
'Either the host country employer is not informed about the immigrants' skills, when education is
acquired in the source country (Stark, 1995) or the source country employer knows too little about
the return migrants' skills, when education is acquired abroad (Kwok and Leland, 1982). In the first
case employers learn about the real skills of the immigrants only some time after employment.
Initially all immigrants are paid according to the average productivity of the cohort. But once
learning has taken place and wages have adjusted to individual productivity, it is not profitable for
the less skilled workers to stay abroad. In the second case source countiy employers cannot judge
skill through the veil of foreign education and thus cause an adverse selection of return migrants.
Thirdly, Return migration can be a way of hedging against the volatility of the labor markets in
14
migrants is the result. In the present model return migration also self-selects the less
skilled migrants, but it results from an investment in human capital accumulation
abroad that increases productivity in the home country.
Given the emphasis placed on human capital accumulation and tethnological progress
for the growth prospects of an economy, it seems logical to look at the roles of
migration, brain drain and return migration in a dynamic model of endogenous
growth. There are two generations of endogenous growth models.
The first generation, started among others with Lucas (1988), stated that there is real
endogenous growth, if the factor of production, that can be accumulated, exhibit at
least constant returns. Human capital is one of them. Labor mobility without
disproportional loss of human capital (brain drain) from a less developed to a more
developed country increases the general capital stock of the remaining workers. As a
result conditional convergence of income in the two economies speeds up (Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 1995b, Chapter 9). Baldwin and Venables (1994) show in a model with
an externality associated with human capital that disproportional loss of human capital
gives rise to a slow inflow of physical capital as well as to a slow transition and catch-
up.
The second generation endogenous growth theory engendered by Aghion and Howitt
(1992) offered some microeconomic foundations. Here the human capital intensive
R&D sector generates technological progress, which drives growth. Returns to R&D
are not diminishing in the long run due to spillovers. In this context, economies with a
lower level of technological progress tend to stay behind even if they accumulate
factor of production, unless technology diffuses. In other words, less developed
countries can catch up, if some imitation of new technologies takes place there. This
is possible, because imitation is less costly than invention (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1 995a).
source and host countly (Dustmann, 1997). The third approach does not offer any rationale for the
adverse selection of returnees.
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The model presented here is a reduced form of a growth model with endogenous
technological progress, where agent heterogeneity in skills leads to brain drain. Brain
drain is a source of income divergence. But if technology transfer via return migration
is introduced, a trade-off between brain drain and technology gain appears. Even
though the presented growth model is kept extremely simple, the outcome has
multiple equilibria with some interesting traps.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 the growth
mechanism is presented for the closed economies. In sections 11.3 and 1.4 migration is
introduced and its detrimental effects on growth are demonsirated. Sections 1.5 and
1.6 show under which conditions return migration can produce a catch-up, and
section 1.7 concludes.
1.2.	 The Model
The model presented here uses technological progress as long run growth machine.
There are no explicit skill formation or R&D sectors and no capital accumulation or
transfer payments of any sort (taxes, remittances or international borrowing). We
allow for these simpliijing assumptions, because the focus dl' this chapter is on the
effects of migration on technological progress.'° The growth mechanism is a reduced
form of Aghion and Howitt's (1992) quality ladders with constant return to R&D,
where the increments of technological progress depend on the exogenously given
10 As long as capital and labor are homogenous and do not influence technological progress,
migration has no effect on long run growth (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995b, Chapters 1 and 9).
Because the present model ignores physical and human capital accumulation (and thus savings),
alike Aghion Howitt (1992) it shows no convergence behavior or B-convergence in the sense of Barro
and Sala-I-Martin (1995b, Chapter 1). The economies are always at steady state, which is determined
by technological progress.
Apart from the neoclassical interaction of capital and labor of the Solow-Swan model (Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 1995b, Chapter 1) there are other mechanisms that link migration and capital
markets. It is a well-known fact that return migrants' savings as well as remittances from migrants
in general play a substantial role in capital formation of less developed countries (Dustmann, 1997).
The implications of the Solow-Swan model as well as the effects of remittances and savings of return
migrants would strengthen the effect of technology diffusion. The new locational theoty predicts the
contrary of the neoclassical growth theory: certain core areas that attract labor might as a result also
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talent of the inventors The mechanism was taken from a growth model by Murphy,
Schleifer and Vishny (1991). When introducing migration and return migration, even
this reduced form will generate considerable dynamic effects.
We consider an economy endowed with n agents who are heterogeneous in
productive talent and live for one period. Each agent has access to the best available
technology in her country. Talent is denoted A and is distributed continuously on the
interval [1,a] with a time invariant, finite and strictly positive density function f(a)
(f f(A) = 1 Vt; and f(A) > 0). Time is indexed by the letter 1.
The available production technology in period t is denoted by St . The individual
production function is continuos and monotone with talent and technology as factors
of production. It is denoted by h(.,.), where marginal productivities and cross
derivatives of talent and technology are positive. Personal marginal output is perfectly
appropriable. Each person has an income y
= h(s, , A)	 h > 0, h > 0 and h >0 Vt	 (1.1)
One simple functional form for h(s, A), that satisfies these conditions is
= As,	 (1.2)
Technological progress and growth are generated by knowledge spillovers from the
high talented of the previous generation to the entire population of the next
generation. The most talented person in the economy puts the prevailing technology
to best use and gets remunerated for that fully in her active life. Her application of
technology becomes public knowledge for the next generation of users in form of a
more advanced technology. The new generation can then put the advanced
attract capital and vice versa (circular causation, Krugman, 1991, Chapter 1). This would enhance
the effect of brain drain.
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technology to work according to their talent. The dynamic path of the production
technology is therefore
s,4.1 =as, =a''s0	 (1.3)
It may seem more plausible to assume that the new technology is a function of some
average of human capital available in the economy rather than only the very top level
of talent, but for expositional simplicity the simplest technology transfer is assumed
here.
Using equation (1.2 and 1.3), per capita income grows at the constant rate y,
As,4.1 - As,
=a-1	 (1.4)
As,
Technological progress obviously grows at the same rate.
1.3.	 Migration
We now suppose that the worlds consists of two countries, Home (source) and
Foreign (host), where Foreign is denoted by upper f Foreign has for some
exogenously given reasons reached a more advanced level of development than
Home. This is represented by s0 inferior to s by an exogenously given factor o
( o <1). In the absence of factor mobility equation (1.3) implies that the ratio of
technology of the two counties does not change over time (even though the absolute
income difference increases).
= 5,	 Vt	 (1.5)
As a result in Foreign production technologies are better, people are wealthier and
labor income relative to talent is higher. The potential for migration in this model
arises solely due to the higher level of technology in Foreign, as capital accumulation
is ignored. Each person in Home can apply her talent more productively in Foreign
and increase her income.
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It is unlikely, however, that a migrant can move to another country without any cost
to migration. Migration cost arise for several reasons:'t
• When moving to another country a person loses time as well as productivity.
She has to integrate in a new environment and learn about country specificities
(language, culture, administration, etc.) Her own country specific knowledge
becomes obsolete. Thus the fact that countries differ makes migration costly in
terms of productivity.
• The capacity to integrate in a new environment may well be correlated to the
level of productive talent in general. Higher productive talent may stand for a
better level of general education including foreign languages and experience. It
may also involve a better capacity to learn and to adapt to new situations. In
addition higher talent may stand for knowledge that is less country specific, so
that it can be applied readily in other countries.'2
• Leaving the home country may generate disutility due to separation from home,
friends and family. In addition, increased uncertainty about future income may
reduce the expected value of income earned abroad. Thus, income earned
abroad may be valued less than the same income at home.
•	 Migration naturally creates real search and travelling cost.
These cost also seem to depend negatively on cultural, geographical and technological
distance of the two economies. Cultural closeness simplifies integration. Geographical
"See Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), where the cost of migration are fixed. In (Galor and Stark,
1990, 1991) returnees work harder and save more, because utility drawn from consumption in the
host countiy is lower and the return in the host countiy is higher. In Haque and Kim (1994)
migration cost rise with the average level of human capital as a proxy for forgone wages in the time
lost due to migration.
12 Academics, for instance, are usually veiy mobile internationally. Manual workers on the other
hand also seem rather mobile. The same argument might thus also apply the other way around: the
lower the level of education the less depreciation of talent takes place due to a move to another
counuy. Possibly the net gain of migration are such that migrants typically select themselves from
both end of the talent distribution (Haque and Kim, 1994).
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closeness reduces search and separation cost. And technological closeness reduces the
loss of productivity.
Let us define for the present model the cost of migration as a continuous function of
the variables of the model'3
Ct" = c(A, s , so	 (1.6)
If a person migrates from Home to Foreign, she receives a higher return to her talent
and pays Ct'. The net gain from migration is denoted by G7 = g(A, s , s[). She
migrates if the net return from migration exceeds the return from staying home
G = h(sf, A) - h(s , A) - C" >0	 (1.7)
We speak of brain drain, if migration is less than total (not everybody leaves) and the
average level of productive human capital of the group of migrants is higher than that
of the non-migrants.
Proposition 1.1: A necessary condition for brain drain is that
(i) Agents are heterogeneous and
(ii) the net gain from migration is positive only for some agents.
Proof:
(i) Suppose the distribution of A is degenerate at A such that f(A) =1. The net
gain from migration is then the same for all agents and either all agents or
nobody leaves. Hence there is no brain drain.
(ii) Suppose now that agents are heterogeneous, but the net gain from migration
has the same sign for all agents. There is total migration if the net gain is
positive and no migration if the net gain is negative, but there is no brain drain.
QED.
' Geographical and cultural distance as well as uncertainty and education are not made explicit in
this model.
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There is no brain drain in the following example, although the agents are
heterogeneous in talent. Assume that the cost of migration consist of the product of A
and a function and the production function is also proportional in A as in equation
(1.2).
C =Aq(sf, ․ )	 (1.8)
Then everybody independently of her talent level A has incentives to migrate as long
as
—s
	 (1.9)
In this case certain unknown selection criteria will lead to migration, but the more
talented do not flow more easily than the others. The sufficient condition for brain
drain obviously involves that heterogeneity is in productive human capital and that the
net gain from migration rises with productive human capital.
Other models of endogenous growth and brain drain include an educational sector
(Haque and Kim, 1994, and Mountford, 1997). This sector serves as a growth
machine as in Lucas (1988). In order to generate brain drain, heterogeneity of agents
is also required. It explains why certain agents accumulate more human capital than
others do.'4 Furthermore, the existence of the educational sector gives rise to the
argument that higher return abroad increases incentives for human capital
accumulation of agents of the source country (Miyagiwa, 1991). An educational
sector would not change the results of our model, however.
14 As the present model, these models assume differing latent ability. With an explicit educational
sector imperfect credit markets and other market imperfections affecting the choice of education
could also lead to heterogeneous levels of human capital accumulation, even if agents are initially the
same. In this sense explicit human capital accumulation gives room to other arguments. It does,
however, not change the basic result that brain drain requires agent heterogeneity.
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As the purpose of this chapter is to show the effects of brain drain on long run
growth, that is generated by technological progress, for the remainder of the chapter
we will concentrate on net gain functions that monotonously rise in talent.
1.4.	 Migration and Growth
For the simple model developed and the net gain function assumed migration can only
lead to loss of human capital. This in turn influences technological progress and
growth.
Proposition 1.2: If the net gain from migration is such that that migrants select
themselves from the upper level of the talent distribution, growth of technological
progress and income in the home country are slowed down. Technology and income
levels in the two countries diverge until total migration has taken place.
Proof: The talent level that satisfies inequality (1.7) with equality determines the last
non migrant. It is denoted by A and is a function of the production function and the
cost function.
A7' =A(s[,s,)	 (1.10)
If A exists (A7' € [1, a]), then it is unique, because the net gain G" is
monotonous. If A71 E [1, a[, some loss of human capital takes place due to migration.
If A' does not exist, there is either immediate total migration (G7 1 >0 VA) or no
migration (G' <0 VA). If A7' E [1,a[, technical progress is slowed, because the
higher levels of talent that previously led to the improvements of the prevailing
technology have left. After migration, technological progress s evolves as follows
s1=AMs,<as1 V4M.<a	 (1.11)
We define an indicator of relative development and convergence o'" =	 when
agents are mobile across countries. As long as there is no migration, a 1 = o. In
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that case the countries do neither converge nor diverge. When migration takes place,
the countries diverge in relative income and progress as o falls over time.
U A"s" ATMM_Sz+I_	
.L_0'	 A"<a
- __7_ -s 1 asf	 a
(1.12)
The system has one unstable equilibrium at o' = 1 where the countries are equal.
When the countries are different as assumed here, the less advanced country's
technology will diverge until total migration has taken place. QED.
Corollary 1: Emigration to Foreign does not affect growth rates in Foreign, because
the top levels of the talent distribution are not affected.'5
Corollary 2: The per capita growth rate falls as a result of migration.
Proof:
M - As —As
-	
=A7 
—1<a-1=y+ VAM <a	 (1.13)
As
QED.
Migration leads to a temporary depletion of human capital in the less advanced home
country. This in turn hampers technological progress and leads to a continuous
widening of the initial gap of technology between the two countries.
15 if it were the average level of human capital that determined technical progress, the receiving
countly would benefit from immigration. For examples of this kind see Haque and Kim (1997).
Another effect of inflow of labor that is also excluded here is discussed in Braun (Barro and SaIa-I-
Martin, 1995b, Chapter 9). Braun introduces explicit congestion effects by having land as a third
freely accessible factor of production. The congestion convexifles the model, explaining why less
advanced countries are not depopulated.
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1.5.	 Return Migration
Let us now consider labor mobility as a source of technology transfer via return
migration. Migrants are said to keep links with their home country. Under certain
conditions a migrant returns to her home country in the active part of her life. By
doing so she may import more advanced technologies, and hence she possibly
supports technological progress in the home country.
In order to model return migration we split the life time of one person t into two
subperiods, 1 and 2. In subperiod 1 a person can emigrate to Foreign, in subperiod 2
she can return if she has emigrated before (emigrating only in subperiod 2 is
economically implausible as will be shown). The agent faces the same migration cost
C in each subperiod if they are in Foreign.' 6 She also produces output twice with
the prevailing level of technology. Personal income can take four outcomes
(y,y,yandy7). Staying at Home in both periods a person earns
hh 
= 2h(s , A)	 (1.14)
In Foreign respectively
= 2[h(s[,A)—C']	 (1.15)
16 Actual cost of migration probably fall for the second subperiod in Foreign. If the cost of migration
are split in one-off cost of searching, moving and integrating on one hand and continuous cost of
living away from home on the other hand, the first component should disappear or become negative
in the second subperiod. In order to simp1i1t we have kept the cost constant throughout the two
subperiods. Results are not affected by this assumption. Arguably the one-off component of the
migration cost is much smaller then the long term component.
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If she migrates and returns in the second period of her active life, she can repatriate a
fraction a of the new technology to Home. Her income is
y =h(sf ,A)—C +h(s,A)
(1.16)
where s' = af + (1— a)s, with a E [0,1]
Returning is cost free. The fraction (1-a) of home technology signifies that a returnee
producing in Home has to rely partly on local infrastructure and local suppliers. The
larger a, the higher are a migrant's incentives to return to home. At a=1 full
technology transfer takes place and all migrants return.
If she stays in Home in the first subperiod and migrates in the second, she earns
y7 =h(s,,A)+h(s[,A)—C	 (1.17)
Lemma 1.1: No agent migrates only in subperiod 2 of her life ( y7' <yf).
Proof:
y<ytm (1.18)
h(s,,A)+h(s[,A)—C71 <h(s[,A)+h(s',A)—C'
This always holds for (s[ > s1 ), and this inequality holds for all I and A. QED.
Leaving in period 1 costs the same as in period 2, but gives the agent access to the
better technology in both subperiods.
There are three options left: stay Home, migrate&return and emigrate for both
periods.
Agents do not migrate at all, if the net return from staying is positive. That is the case
if y ^ Max(y/", y'). Return migration takes place in the second subperiod if
> Max(y, y,f). Define A as the level of talent of an agent that is indifferent
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between staying at home and return migrating (y = yt111 ). Agents migrate for both
subperiods if y,' > Max(j' , y")). Define A.m as the level of talent of an agent that
is indifferent between returning in subperiod 2 and staying in Foreign in that period
(y,m=y).
For what follows we will assume that the net gain from migrating in the second
subperiod (y f y1b ) monotonously increases in A.'7
Lemma 1.2: If (ye' -ye) increases monotonously in A, then (yf' -yr) and
(y,' - y ) also increase monotonously in A.
Proof: see Appendix 1A.
We will show now that under certain parameter constellations agents on the lower
end of the talent distribution stay at home, agents at the higher end of the talent
distribution emigrate for their entire active life and agents in the middle of the talent
distribution migrate and return home.
Proposition 1.3: For all 1 A111' > A71 . Therefore, if A,1'1',A/" c [i,a[, a person with
talent A ^ A11" will not migrate at all. A person talented with A, <A ^ A,'1  will
migrate in subperiod 1 and return in the next subperiod. For a person with A >
migration in both subperiods is profitable.
Proof: From the proof to Lemma 1.2 we know that
y '1' -y >y,' -y," Vt,VA	 (1.19)
"This is a slightly stronger assumption about the shape of the cost of migration than we have made
in the previous section. There we assumed that the net gain function of migration
(G7 = h(sf , A) - h(s, , A) - c7) is monotonously increasing in talent. if cp does for
instance not vaiy mA, then the net gain (yfl - )fr ) also increases mA.
8'-h=]	
_.!-1 >0 as h' >0
6A	 8AI,..,,	 SAl,.
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We also know that the right hand side and the left hand side are monotonously
increasing in A. Thus the left hand side of the inequality equals 0 for a lower level of
talent (Ar) than the right hand side (A,"). QED.
Proposition 1.4: For A, or A" [1,a[ there are several extreme cases:
(iii) ify/1' - y7 ^ 0 VA , the cost of migration relative to the productivity gain are
so high that nobody emigrates.
(iv) if	
-	
^ 0 VA and 3A ,ft -
	
>0, the cost of migration relative to
the gain from returning is so high that all migrants return.
(v) If y,' -	 > 0 VA , the productivity gain relative to the cost of migration are
so high that there is total migration.
Proof: see Appendix lB.
In case of migration the Home economy can lose the highest tail of the talent
distribution to Foreign. There is, however, a source of technological catch-up due to
the transfer of the more productive technology via return migration.
1.6.	 Return Migration and Growth
When agents return and introduce a better technology, they generate the potential for
convergence. In this model there are two countervailing effects of migration on
growth: due to the net gain functions the highly talented are drawn to Foreign. If they
do not return, their input into technological progress for future generations is lost.
This effect, known as brain drain effect, was described in section 1.4. But the less
talented of the migrants may return to home and lead to technology spillovers as
> .s . This may speed up growth. A priori, it is not clear which effect dominates.
The transfer of technology is assumed frictionless in terms of technology of the next
period. At no migration the model behaves as in section 1.4. With return migration,
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the new technology in Home , s 1 , results from the product of the talent of the most
talented returnee and the latest foreign level of technology'8
fas '	 A11" E [1,a[ and A	 [l,a[ (all return)	 (1.20)
= 14 S( 4 E [1,a[ (some return)
Clearly, total return migration leads to immediate convergence of s and	 If
only a portion of migrants return, convergence depends on the relation of human
capital loss to technology gain. For an interior solution we are confronted with a
difference equation in s and s. In order to study the dynamics and possible
equilibria we specii' the production ft,nction and the cost of migration C,M.
Migration cost are assumed to reduce the migrant's level of productive talent. The
cost are
C7"=zs( with zE[O,00[	 (1.21)
Using equations (1.12), (1.15) and (1.16) and the explicit production function in
equation (1.2) the following difference equation in o, and cr" can be derived
= Aj"s	 VAj" E [1,a]
S 4•1 =	 ( f)S	 (1.22)
z	
**	 Va,E[1-1I a) ' - a(I_a)]
a(1—a)(1—cr )
This equation determines the growth path of the economy, when migration and some
but not total return migration is taking place. Combining this with the other three
cases of migration we get a complete picture of the effects of migration on growth.
It may be more plausible that the foreign technology can only partly determine the local
technology's development path. Here again we have chosen the simplest specification without loss of
generality.
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Depending on respective weight of cost, transferability and the productivity
differential, there are four areas of the growth path:
1. Total migration (Aim <1). A growth rate in Home does not exist.
2. Some return migration (1 ^ A <a). Depending on the solution of the
difference equation (1.22) Home's income and productivity converge or diverge
(under which conditions, will be discussed later).
3. All migrants return (Afb ^ a). Home's income and productivity converges
within one period.
4. Nobody leaves (A ^ a). Home's growth rate is unaffected and income and
productivity do not converge.
The convergence indicator c	 takes the form
for z<(1—a) -: =
(1) not existant
z(2)
a(1 - a)(1 -
Va
rl_......L..._ 1-Vo E1	 (I-a)'	 a(I-a)
1— z r(3) 1	 Va' E [1- a(I-cz)'	 a(I+a) I.
S(4)o'	 Va1E[1-(1), J
and
for z^(1—a)
z(2)
0*	 I a(1—a)(1—o, )1
(4) cr'
Vo' E]O,1 - a(I-a)
'V'7 EEl-	 1— za(1-a)'	 a(l+a)L (1.23)
**Va e[1— 5 11a(I+a)' I
After solving the difference equation in a for the relevant ranges (see Appendix 1C)
and assuming that a>4' 9, the function in (1.23) is represented in Figure 1.1. It shows
the convergence indicator a,' as a function of a(I-a)' a function that rises in cost and
transferability.
a>4 signifies that the foreign growth rate (a-i) and the steps in which productivity progresses arc
relatively high. In addition, the talent distribution has more variation. Under no migration this
implies a more rapidly increasing difference in absolute levels of technology. When a is relatively
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Figure 1.1: Return Migration and Growth, if Productive Talent is Reduced
Abroad
1
No Migration
oI+J
-	 teadyStates
0
0—	 I
	
a
o 1/	 1/4	
a(i + a)
'(i—a)
	
- a(i-a)
Rising cost of migration decrease incentives to go in subperiod 1 and incentives to
stay in Foreign in subperiod 2, because high cost also deter from staying. A rising rate
of transferability a increases both the incentive to migrate and the incentive to return.
It pushes people to train in Foreign and return to home. Therefore higher cost and
transferability of technology reduce actual brain drain.
As long as the cost/transferability parameter	 is high (>'h), returning human
capital in combination with technology transfer leads to convergence. This is
represented in Figure 1.1 to the right of the vertical line at ¼. At lower levels of a(I-a)
(<'4) and a large initial technology gap between the two countries there is a set of
long term stable equilibria with a constant technology gap. Return migration at lower
levels of the talent distribution and the technology spillovers ensure persistence of the
large (a>4) and migration takes place return migration leads to convergence in smaller steps and
brain drain has a more pronounced effect on growth.
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gap. This is an interesting trap. the Home country is in some respect benefiting from
migration due to the technology transfers, but the loss of human capital taking place
at the same time diminishes the impact of the new technologies. Lacking human
capital is preventing real convergence. A similar story applies for a set of unstable
equilibria in the same region.
At very low levels of the cost/transferability parameter a(1-a) and large income gaps
the model predicts the disappearance of the home country as a result of migration. In
reality this is for several reasons implausible (e.g. limitations at the side of the
receiving country, not the entire population is part of the workforce, the marginal
productivity of the other factors of production, ignored here, should increase at some
point with migration, etc.). An important depletion of human capital and the work
force can, however, be observed in rural regions like the Mezzogiorno in Italy or in
part of the former Eastern Germany.
For similar countries and high cost/transferability there is either total return migration
or no migration at all. Total return ensures immediate convergence, as human capital
is not lost but technology is transferred. Migration within the European community or
between Europe and the United States may well have this component. Noteworthy is
also the case where migration does not produce a positive return to any agent. In
Figure 1.1, it lies above and to the right of the o = 1— a(1+a) -line. In that case the
model predicts a technology gap that persists. This may add to explaining why
relatively small gaps in growth and technology tend to persist. If the rate of
transferability a rises in relation to the cost z, the area without migration will shrink.
In Appendix 1D we discuss some other types of migration cost functions and show
that the fundamental results of this section are robust to changes in the cost function.
1.7.	 Conclusions
If technological progress is the driving force of growth, developing countries can only
converge in income if technology diffuses from the more advanced countries. Return
migration of foreign-trained agents is an important source of technology diffusion. In
this context, brain drain may only be the first step in allowing less developed countries
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to imitate modern technological advances. Technology refers here to hard sciences as
well as to more business-oriented progress.
Empirical research shows that brain drain is certainly still a real issue with developing
countries (Strepetova, 1995), but if incentives to return are right, it may be a source
of income convergence. This is because the more talented also are more productive in
transferring and applying the new technologies.
We show in a simple growth model with endogenous technological progress, that
there is a trade-off between brain drain and technology transfer for developing
countries. Brain drain occurs if agents' net gain from migration rises with their level
human capital. In the absence of technology transfer brain drain leads to total
depletion of human capital in the less developed country. Growth rates diverge. If
technology can be transferred partly, there is scope for return migration. The
returnees speed up technological convergence, and if the returnees level of talent is
not too low, there can be convergence.
Ensuing from the assumptions about the production function and the cost of
migration, the possibility of technology transfers and the endogenous growth
mechanism, we have two simple results. First, countries that have a small (but not too
small) technology gap converge more easily due to (return) migration. Second, the
higher the levels of cost of producing in a foreign country and transferability, the more
talented people migrate and return. Higher levels of human capital in turn render the
technology transfer more effective.
Moreover, there can be cases where the income gap relative to migration cost is so
low that migration does not take place. then the income gap persist. High technology
transferability reduces this effect.
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Appendix 1A: Proof to Lemma 1.2
Lemma 1.2: If ( y ' —yf") increases monotonously in A, then (yf" —yr) and
( ,,zT - hh ) also increase monotonously in A.
(1) To show that (yf' —yr) increases monotonously in A, it is sufficient to show
that yf" —y > y' —yf" Vt,VA.
h(s(,A)+h(s,A)—C' —2h(s ,A)> 2h(sf,A)-2C' —h(s(,A)—h(s,A)+C'
h(s[,A)+h(s',A)—C —2h(s ,A)> h(s[,A)—h(s,A)—C' 	 (1.24)
h(s,A) — h(s ,A)>0
The last inequality holds for all t and A.
(ii) To show that (y - y ) increases monotonously in A, it is sufficient to show
that	
—y>'—yf" Vt,VA.
(y
	r) >I(yff y;th)
and
I(yff_yh)>ff_yft	 (1.25)
h(s[,A)—h(s,,A)—C' >h(sf,A)—h(s',A)—C
h(s',A)—h(s,A)>O
The last inequality holds for all t and A. QED.
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Appendix 1B: Proof to Proposition 1.4
For the proof we first establish
Lemma 1.3: If y ^Max(y,m ,y) ,then yf >y,'.
Proof: This proof is by contradiction. Assumey ^Max(yf",y') holds, but
yf" <y'.Then
yth^y
h(s1 ,A)^ h(s(,A)—C
but also	 (1.26)
h(s,A)>h(s ,A)^h(s(,A)—C
hence
yh>yff
which is contradicted by our assumption. QED.
If staying Home in both subperiods is more profitable than migrating, return migration
is also more profitable than staying in the second subperiod.
Proposition 1.4: For A7" or Af" [1, a[ there are several extreme cases:
(i) ify - hh 0 VA , the cost of migration relative to the productivity gain are
so high that nobody emigrates.
(ii) if y,1? - y,"' <0 VA and	 ,fh - hh >0, the cost of migration relative to
the gain from returning is so high that all migrants return.
(iii) If y,35 - y1 ' > 0 VA , the productivity gain relative to the cost of migration are
so high that there is total migration.
Proof:
(i) If y - y ^ 0 VA , then Lemma 1.3 states that y0 - y ^ 0 VA . Hence
there is no migration.
(ii) If y - y/" ^ 0 VA and IA y," -	 >0, there is clearly no long term
migration.
(iii) If y - yf" > 0 VA , then the proof of Lemma 1.2 states that
- y >0 VA . Hence there is total migration.
QED.
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Appendix 1C: Solution to the Difference Equation (1.23)
For the given range cr evolves according to a difference equation. To find the
Is	 **
steady states of this equation we solve it for o =
Is	 z
Is
)
4z
J/2 22'a(1—a)
4z
where zI = 
1— a(1— a)
va_rIsE!'— ___z
	 z(1-a) '	 a(1-a)
(1.27)
Va" Eli - (1-a) - a(1-a) I
This is solved in the usual way. For zi >0, there can be two steady states.
___	 13jJ	 ___	 ___
-+ + - Ji - 4:	 and	 2	 2 2 
'.J	 a(1—a) Vo- E1	 a(I-a) [• The	 a(1—a)
first is stable, the second unstable.2° For zi =0, the steady state is a saddle point at
ci" 
= 4 . The economies converges to that steady state, if the initial o <f and
diverge away if o' > 4
. 
For LI <0, there is no steady state in the given range.
20 An equilibrium is stable if to the left of it cy > o grows) and to the right of it
o <a" (cr, falls). It is unstable if the opposite is true. A sadd]e point converges from one side
only.
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Appendix 1D: Different Cost Functions of Migration
Two other functions will be presented for the cost of migration that are also non
proportional to talent. First we assume that the cost of migration depends on the
technology gap rather than reducing productive talent directly. A higher technology
gap may cause more adaptation cost for the migrant, because she has to learn more in
order to be able to apply the modern technologies productively. Such cost have the
shape of
c'=e(s[-s)	 with GE]O,00[	 (1.28)
Because the cost rise together with the productivity gain, the decision to migrate does
not depend on the technology gap, but only on the cost relative to the transferability
of technology. Equation (1.23) becomes
1(1) not existant
e
**	 (2) a(1-a)
1(3) 1
1
**
(4)
V9 E]O,(1- a)[
V 0 € [(1 - a), (1- a)a[
V 6 € [(1- a)a, (1+ a)a[
y e €[(1+a)a,00[
(1.29)
Figure 1.2 shows that the fundamental results are the same with respect to the effect
of the cost of migration and the transferability parameter. Function (1.29,2) generates
stable equilibria for its range, that rise with the cost/transferability parameters. The
size of the initial technology gap is not inversely related to convergence. It has no
impact on the chance of convergence, because a larger technology gap creates higher
cost, which motivates more return migration.
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Figure 1.2: Return Migration and Growth, if Migration Cost Rise with the
Technology Gap
0	 1	 a	 (1+a)a(J)
The level of talent may be added as a scaling factor to the cost function, such that the
cost of integration fall with the level of talent.
CM =	 - s) with 2 E]0,00[	 (1.30)
This will increase the area where return migration with technology transfer does not
compensate for the loss of human capital, because a larger portion of the talented find
profitable to remain in Foreign for both periods of production. Function (1.29)
becomes
(1) not existant	 VA E]0,(1—a)[
(2) 2	 VA E [(1 - a), (1— a)a2 [
=	 Va (1—a)
(3) 1	 V2 E [(1— a)a 2 , (1 + a)a2[
2()°	 V2e[(1+a)a,00[
(1.31)
Secondly, cost of migration are assumed to depend on the level of talent inversely.
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O<1u^A
if f2As11,
yt -
2As[
u>A (1.32)
The rationale is the same as in the previous case. A more talented person might find it
easier to integrate and to become productive in a new environment. We express the
cost in terms of depreciation of productive talent due to migration. For some levels of
the cost parameter and talent the cost of migration may even be equal to zero.
Hence return when producing in Foreign is
The convergence parameter a 1 takes the form
ap<1 :=
(1) not existant
(2)+°
(3)1
(4) cr
Vcr E]O, (I-a)p [
•*	 1-a#,	 a-a/iVo, E [ (I_a)p '(I-a)z I
a-a/i a+a,u rVA. E [ (1-a)4u' (I+a)p L
f,%[
a+a#A 1](I+a)p'
and
1(2)	 + (I-a)pI	 a	 a
es
ap>1
I..
L(4) °
(1.33)
a-a/iFVo, E [" (I-a)p I
VA.E[	 a+a/i[(1-a)/i ' (I+a)p
vA. €E 1u 11(1+a)p' J
Presented in Figure 1.3, this case is similar to the two other cases. The equilibria in
function (1.33,2) are stable. Noteworthy is only that for p ^ a the depreciation factor
of talent is so high that the talent level of the returning migrants in combination with
the technology transfer always ensures immediate convergence.
38
1No Mtgration
Cl
-a + au
TotaiReturn (1+a)u
(;i:'p
au
Figure 1.3: Return Migration and Growth, if Migration Cost Depend Inversely
on Talent
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The two versions presented here (cost that depend on the technology gap and cost
that depend inversely on the talent levels of the individuals) both lead to similar results
as the first cost function presented in section 1.6. As long as productivity is
distributed heterogeneously in the economy and the cost of migration are not
proportional to the level of talent of the migrant, human capital loss can lead to
divergence in growth rates. Nevertheless return migration can reverse that effect due
to technology transfers.
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2. Can Technology Transfer be enhanced by a Tariff, if
Products are Vertically Differentiated?
2.1.	 Introduction
The transfer of technology is an important issue of developing economies. When trade
and FDI take place between asymmetric countries, the technological growth in the
less developed country might actually be hampered. This is because the initial
conditions are such that the less developed country has a comparative advantage in
low quality and low technology products, engendering static gains from trade but also
dynamic disadvantages in terms of technological development. This mechanism has
been modeled by Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) or Young (1991) among
others. Motta et al. (1997) use a model of vertical product differentiation to show that
leapfrogging of the less developed countries' industry is very unlikely.
One way of avoiding this development trap, is to attract technology transfer from
more developed countries. Technology transfer is a source of catch-up, as the
imitation of existent technologies should be faster and less costly than the creation of
new technological progress. This mechanism is explicitly modeled in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995a) and Findley (1978).
In order to attract technological transfers and benefit from them, the receiving country
has to offer the right conditions. The empirical and theoretical literature underlines the
importance of factors such as education of the local workforce and local
infrastructure. Empirical results can be found in Evenson and Westphal (1995).
Rodriguez-Clare (1998) shows that multinational firms place more high technology
production facilities, if more diversified inputs are available in the local industry. This
in turn generates positive spillovers to the local economy. BlomstrOm and Wang
(1992) come to a similar conclusion. In their model a higher level of quality of the
local industry induces multinationals to invest in costly technology transfer in order to
be competitive on the local market. The obvious policy advice is to further the local
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infrastructure and educational levels.
Kabiraj and Marjit (1998) take a different approach. They argue that in a world of
Cournot-Nash competition between a more productive firm from a more developed
country and a less productive firm in a less advanced country a tariff can induce the
high productivity firm to sell its knowledge to the other firm. This is because the tariff
transfers some profits of the productive firm to the less productive firm. Thus the gain
from selling the better technology rises. The tariff policy seems much easier to realize
than the support of the local education and infrastructure, because it does not need to
be financed.
Kabiraj and Marjit's model ignores the fact that producing the lower quality products
might be more profitable, because the country benefits form its comparative
advantages. Motta et a!. (1997) model this idea in a world of vertical product
differentiation. The country that in autarky produces a low quality product will most
probably continue to do so in free trade. This is because firms want to diversify their
products in order to maximize monopoly power.
The present chapter shows that in a world of vertically differentiated products a tariff
can induce the low quality firm to spend the fixed cost of upgrading its quality. The
tariff increases in some sense the production cost of the importing high quality firm.
This shifts the low quality firm's incentives away form product differentiation, because
it can generate additional profits by undercutting the other firm's price with better
quality products. It is assumed that only technology transfers from more developed
countries via FDI or licensing can realize quality upgrades at reasonable cost.
It is shown under which conditions a tariff induces technology transfer. Two cases are
considered. Markets are integrated for the foreign firm in the first case, so that it will
not react in prices to the quality upgrade of the local firm. In the second case, markets
are segmented in prices, so that the foreign firm interacts strategically with the local
firm. In both cases there exists a tariff that induces technology transfer to the local
firm. The positive welfare effect of the quality upgrade is more pronounced in the
second case, however, because the tariff induces a reduction in the foreign firm's price
in addition to the improvement of the local quality.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.3 presents the model
without price interaction. Section 2.4 introduces strategic interaction of the two firms.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2.	 The Model
We assume a small transforming economy with a substantial need for restructuring
and technological catch-up (Home). As a result of both of these factors, the quality of
its entire output as well as income levels lag behind those of the rest of the world.
Technological know-how, necessary to improve the quality of the local product, is a
local public good and does not automatically difThse from the rest of the world to the
small economy.
The model is a partial equilibrium model. Factor markets are ignored and only one
industrial sector is studied. In this sector products are vertically differentiated. One
foreign and one local firm serve this sector, each firm supplying one quality. 2' For
historic reasons the foreign firm produces a quality level higher than the locally
produced quality (Motta et al., 1997).
We consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, the government of Home chooses
the tariff level t. In the second stage, the local firm chooses its quality given import
prices and import quality. The chosen quality level is determined by the level of
technology transfer on a one-to-one basis. In the third stage, after technologies have
been chosen, the local and the foreign producer compete in prices. The game is solved
by backward induction in the standard way.
We first consider the case where the world market is integrated in prices and the
foreign firm does not vary its price as a result of competitive pressure of the local
firm. I. e., the local firm chooses the quality level in the second stage as well as the
21 The foreign and the local market are integrated in terms of quality. This amounts to the
assumption adopted by Venables (1990) that the finn adopts a single capacity for the whole
production but chooses different prices in each market.
This implies that high quality also requires high technological and other intangible know-how
compared to low quality production. This assumption seems warranted by the theoretical and
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prices in the third stage given import prices and quality. Second, we relax that
assumption and allow for strategic interaction in price setting between the two firms.
The foreign level of quality remains exogenous. For both cases we can show that
there exists a range of positive tariff levels which induce the local quality to be
improved. In the case of integrated markets, the tariff induced quality upgrade only
increases welfare under certain conditions. With strategic interaction between the two
firms welfare in Home unambiguously rises in the tariff level, because the tariff not
only improves quality but also reduces the price of the imported good.
2.3.	 Exogenous Import Prices
The home market is fully integrated with the foreign market in terms of prices as well
as in terms of quality, so that the foreign firm charges the same price on all markets.
Given market integration and the marginal size of the home market compared to
Foreign, we can consider the foreign level of price as exogenous to the small
economy. In addition we rule out that any firm can serve the entire home market as a
monopolist or can be driven out of the market, as this will most probably be avoided
by anti-trust regulations. The small country can, however, levy and enforce a tariff t
on imports.
For the demand side a simple model of vertical differentiation (Tirole, 1988, Chapter
7) is adopted. Consumers in Home buy either one or zero units of one of the available
goods. The consumer's utility is separable in quality and income
=	 (2.1){ - p	 if the consumer buys good of quality s
if the comsumer does not buy
empirical literature on North-South trade (see for instance Flam and Helpman, 1987 or Krugman,
1980).
The foreign firm can have incentive to either improve its quality above the initial level or to
leapfrog to a lower quality level. The first case can be excluded by the assumption that the foreign
level of quality results from the state-of-the-art technological know-how and cannot be increased at
reasonable cost. The second case is excluded by the fact that the firm only supplies one quality and
that the home market is relatively small compared to the foreign market, because the high quality
position yields higher profits (Tirole, 1988, Chapter 7).
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s is a positive real number describing the quality of the good. p is the price of the
good and 8 a taste or an income parameter. 24 8 is uniformly distributed with density
S= 1 and lies between [oJ].
The quality level available in Foreign is denoted by s. It is assumed to be higher than
in Home, either because of higher taste for quality or higher income or else because of
a higher initial quality endowment resulting from natural conditions prevailing in
Foreign (Motta et al., 1997). The imported quality is sold in Home at price p*+f.
Therefore there are two qualities on offer on the local market: the imported
international good s and the low local quality good s, where s E[O,S *]. The
consumers decide whether to buy at all and choose between the qualities. For a
positive demand for both qualities in the small country two conditions need to be
satisfied:
Assumption 2.1: O<p"<Gs'.
Under this assumption the imported product can be afforded by at least some
consumers in Home, as long as 1=0.
Assumption 2.2: 0 ^ I <9s p *
Further we restrict the model to non-prohibitive tariffs, such that the local firm is
always under competitive pressure from abroad.
The demand for the imported good is
p*+r-pD*(p,p*,t,s,s*) 
=	 )	 (2.2)
24 0 can be interpreted (1) as a taste parameter. In that case consumers with a higher 0 are willing to
pay a higher price for a given level of s, no matter what their income is. (2)11 the utility function is
U=s-(1/0)p, 0 can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between quality and income. A
wealthier person has a lower marginal utility of income or a higher 0.
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(2.4)
(2.5)
All consumers, for whom 9>9 * (p*+t..p)/(s*..․), prefer the imported good to the
local good. All consumers, for whom 9<=p/s, prefer not to buy at all. Hence the
local producer faces the following demand function
p*+t-p\.	 (2.3)D(p,p*,t,s,s*) = ( ,*a /
2.3.1.	 The Price Equilibrium
At the price setting stage (stage three) the local firm maximizes revenues
R = (p - c)D(p,p*,t,s,s*) with respect top, taking qualities, importer's pricep* and
the tariff level I as given. The marginal cost c of production are assumed to be zero.
Maximizing the local producer's revenues with respect top yields the optimal price
- s(p * +t)
25*
Substituting Lb into the demand functions for the local and the imported product in
equations (2.2) and (2.3), we get equilibrium demands
5= p*+I2(s*_s)
(p * +t)(2s * —s)
2s*(s *_s)
The importers equilibrium demand D * is zero, if 9* = 9. This defines 5M (1) as the
level of quality at which the local producer has squeezed the importer out of the
market for a given tariff level.
5M (I) = * 
2(9s* p * 
—1) (2.6)(29s *	 * —I)
sM (1) decreases in the tariff level. Clearly, the higher the cost advantage caused by
the tariff, the lower is the quality level at which the local supplier absorbs the entire
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high-income segment of the market. Given the range oft, 5M (t) E [0, s * _______
Equilibrium local revenues are
= s(p * j)2	 for s < M (t)	 (2.7)4s*(s*_s)
Revenues for s ^ 5M (t) are not considered here, as local monopoly is excluded from
the analysis by assumption. As to be expected, local demand and revenues rise with
increasing trade barriers, whereas import demand falls.
2.3.2.	 The Optimal Quality
The local producer cannot improve the quality of her product s without foreign
assistance. The foreign technology can be bought by license, from a consultant or else
a foreign investor, that owns the technology, can be invited. The quality improvement
could be purely in production technology as well as in management skills or other less
tangible assets. A seller of knowledge makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer taking the
entire surplus and an investor repatriates profits. 25 Quality improvement is associated
with some installation and adaptation cost K(s) = k(s - sJ, where s is the chosen
level of quality and s is the initial level of quality of the local producer.
In the second stage of the game (after the local government has chosen 1), the local
firm faces following optimization problem
Maxyr = R(s,s*,p*,t) - K(s)	 (2.8)
Given that the foreign firm does not decrease its price or increase its quality as a result
of competitive pressure from the local firm, offering an improved local quality and
undercutting the price always increases the local producer's revenues.
We assume that he importer cannot monopolize the home market by buying the local firm.
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•_ (p*+t)2
>0	 for 5<5M(1)
- 4(*_)2
Quality will be improved until the marginal benefit of modernization equals the
marginal cost of it. The first and second order conditions for a maximum are
6i?(, s, p*, - 
K' (.) = 0	 (FOC)
-
and
	 (2.10)
52J( 5* , p*, t)
____________ - K"() <0	 (SOC)
Lemma 2.1: A unique interior solution to this optimization problem exists, if the
following sufficient conditions are satisfied:
(1) K(s) is increasing and continuously differentiable in s.
(2.9)
SR(s = O,s*,p*,t)(ii) K'(s = 0) <
&
SI(sM
 () 5* , p*, I)(iii) K' (sM (t))>
&
Vs*,Vp*,V1
Vt <IM ,Vs*, Vp *
where tM is the solution of K1(SM(t)) = JR(s(t),s,p)&
(iv) K(s)> 
52(S s", p*, r)	 Vs*,Vp*,Vt
Proof: see Appendix 2A.
Lemma 2.1 states the sufficient conditions securing that a unique optimum exists for
SE [O,s'(t)[, as long as the Government chooses a tariff level I E [o,1M[. If the
government chooses	 t, the firm will choose an s ^ 5M (I). This will drive the
importer out of the market. The government can avoid this by choosing 1 E [o, 1M [
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2.3.3.	 The Choice of Tariff
We show now that there exists a tariff level at which the locally produced level of
quality increases, and both products remain on the market. Hence the tariff induces a
technology transfer. In a second step, we show that the government can under some
conditions increase social welfare by levying a positive tariff, so that the induced
technology transfer also is socially beneficial.
Proposition 2.1: The optimal level of quality chosen by the local supplier increases
in the tariff level I with the foreign firm remaining in the market, as long as I E , 1M[.
Proof: For Proposition 2.1 to hold it needs to be the case that
- SE/St - -__________________________
--	 >0
St - SE/S.c - S 2R 2 (. , s* , p*, t)/Ss 2 —K"(.) (2.11)
where E is first order condition of the local producer's optimization problem
(condition (2.10)). This is the case as:
(i)	 The numerator of equation (2.11) is positive:
(p*+t)
2 > 0	 for s^sM(t)SsSt - 2(s*_s) (2.12)
Hence, the local producer's incentives to improve local quality increase with a
tariff as long as the tariff does not drive the importer out of the market
(1 c 1o,,M[).
(ii) The denominator of equation (2.11) is negative. This is the second order
condition for a maximum of the local producer's optimization problem
(condition (2.10)). Lemma 2.1 secures that the second order condition is always
satisfied.
Hence, as long as the importer is not squeezed out of the market (t E [o, M[), local
quality rises with the tariff level. QED.
From equation (2.9) we know that the local producer's marginal revenues rise in the
level of quality for s E [o, s' (t)[, because the increased quality increases the local
supplier's demand and the expense of the importer's demand. As t rises, the price of
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(1))
$
the high-quality product rises. This shifts yet more demand to the local product. Thus,
a higher tariff shifts the marginal revenue curve upward for each level of quality. At a
given level of quality, marginal revenues have increased and the local producer finds it
more profitable at given cost to improve quality. The intersection of the marginal cost
curve and the marginal revenue curve lies at a higher level of quality as a result of the
increased tariff level.
Graphically, the local firm's profit maximization in the second stage of the game can
be represented in the following way for t <tM:
Figure 2.1: The Optimal Supply of Quality with Exogenous p
Marginal Revenue and Cost
I(t = 0)	 I(t > 0)	 (1M)	 sM(l = 0)	 s
At tariff level t=O, the local firm chooses quality .(t = 0). If the tariff on the foreign
good is 0< 1 <1M, the firm improves the quality to .(t> 0). At it = M the firm
4\
(LONDON)
chooses the quality level (1M) and squeezes the importer out of the market. Thus, a
higher price for the imported good protects the local supplier and increases the
incentives to raise the quality of the local good.2'
The benevolent government will now decide, if the tariff-induced technology transfer
is welfare enhancing. In a general equilibrium model of trade a tariff reduces output in
the export sector as it draws factors to the import sector. A tariff thus reduces
imports as well as exports and the static benefits of trade in a full employment
economy. This general equilibrium effect might be somewhat less pertinent when
there is high unemployment and capital is imported.
In the present welfare analysis the potentially positive effects of the technology
transfer on the whole economy are not considered, as the transfer is not explicitly
modeled. The profit of the quality investment goes to the foreign contractor, no
matter what the tariff is, so it can be ignored. Thus welfare considered here consists of
the surplus of the consumers affected by the tariff and tariff revenue. It takes the
following form (for 9* =
	
and Oj
 = --)
W = J(s —-p)S9 +f(.---p)59 (_9*)	 (2.13)
which can be solved to
W=.(9* 2 _912)_p(G*_9, )+ts*(92 _9*2)_p*(9_9*)	 (2.14)
For the demand function assumed here the tariff revenues disappear, because they are
exactly offset by the loss of surplus of the wealthy consumers due to the increased
price of the imported good. The tariff works like a tax on the consumers of the
imported good. We can differentiate the welfare function with respect to t to see the
effect of a tariff. In the case of the exogenous import price this yields
Equation (2.9) shows that marginal revenues also rise in the level of the world market price p*.
Hence, a higher p obviously gives the local producer more incentives to increase her quality even
without a tariff.
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2s(s*_s)
—>	 >0
81 p*s
(2.18)
= 1(9 *2	 * 20, f'-)- (9 * _9	 80 
* 60,
& 26t	
_e,2)+4g(2o*_____
81 	 81	 )P()
chwge mMIP1% of	 iicnc
59*
—	 (9* s * _p*)
81
Change mMzph of the high mcome wzna n 1 txff revuuan
(2.15)
•	 8	 ..	 .Given -i-> 0 (Proposition 2.1), it can be easily venfied that the denvatives have the
following signs (see Appendix 2C for
59*
0, -a-> 0,	 -> 0, and	 — >0,
8181
(2.16)
The lower income consumers' welfare change is ambiguous. As some low-income
consumers are not served any more as the price rises, the utility gain of increased
quality level may not be large enough to compensate the losses. The high-income
consumers' welfare, however, unambiguously falls as they now pay a higher price for
the same good, as long as they still buy it. That is offset by the tariff gains by the
government, so it does not appear in equation (2.15). In addition, some high-income
consumers consume the local product as a result of the increased tariff. They are also
made worse off. If the first effect of the tariff is positive and offsets the second, total
welfare increases. (2.15) can be simplified to
=1.(9*2 
_0,2)_l_(0*_9,)
& 281	 & &
(2.17)
We can now determine under which condition welfare increases as a result of a
positive tariff
Proposition 2.2: For an initial level of 1=0 the government has an incentive to raise
the tariff level 1, as this is welfare enhancing if
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Proof: See Appendix 2A.
Condition (2.18) states that welfare increases in I at 1=0, if the impact of the tanif on
the level of quality is sufficiently strong. Clearly the flatter the marginal cost curve of
quality improvement and/or the more marginal revenue reacts to a change of tariff: the
more positive is the welfare effect of a tariff.
In the next section, we will see that our results are not changed if there is strategic
interaction in price setting, but not in quality. The quality level chosen by the local
producer also increases with the tariff level for I E [o, i" [. The main difference will be
that a tariff generates not only a technology transfer, but also drives down the
importer's price thus generating further welfare gains. Both versions of the model are
extreme cases and the importer's price setting behavior most probably lies somewhere
in between.
2.4.	 Strategic Interaction in Prices
We now consider the same model with the only difference that the importer can price
discriminate between Home and Foreign, because markets are fully segmented. He
will do so in order to maximize his profits of Foreign and Home. As a result, there
will be strategic interaction between the two players in stage three of the game. As
before only non-prohibitive tariff levels are considered. The equivalent of Assumption
2.2 now is (Assumption 2.1 is obviously dropped):
Assumption 2.2a: 0 ^ I <Gs*
2.4.1.	 The Price Equilibrium
The demand structure is unchanged (equations (2.2) and (2.3)), but prices will differ
due to the strategic interaction of the two firms. At the price setting stage both firms
determine their reaction functions by maximizing revenues R = pD(p, p, I, s, s*)
with respect top, taking qualities and tariff level I as given
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R = s(p*+,)
P	 2s''
(2.19)
*R 
'[(ss)9+pi]
The resulting Nash equilibrium in prices is
- 
s(s*s)9+st
4*_
(2.20)
*= 
2s*(s*_s)9_(2s*_s)t
P	 4*_
As to be expected, the local producer's price increases with the tariff level t, whereas
the importer's price falls with t. The decrease in p * is smaller that the increase in t, so
that the consumers of the imported product face a price rise as in the previous case.
But now the importer finances some of the tariff revenues. The level of quality at
which the local producer has squeezed the importer out of the market 5M (t) now
equals
sM(t) = 5* 2(0s*_l)	 SM(t) E [0,S*]	 (2.21)(2 *
Simple calculation shows that * becomes zero, if s = sM (t). The importer is ready
to reduce his price to zero before being driven out of the local market (marginal
production cost equal zero). Equilibrium local revenues for s < 5M (I) are
R= s*4(s*_)9g]2	
(2.22)(4s * _)2 (s * —s)
Without tariff, the local producer's revenue function equals zero for s-0 and s=s and
has a maximum at s=4 7s*. If the tariff level is zero, the firms differentiate their
products in order to increase their monopoly power (Shaked and Sutton, 1981).
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2.4.2.	 The Optimal Quality
We now determine again the local producer's quality choice, given the cost of
technology transfer. The local firm's optimization problem in the second stage of the
game is as before
Max,r = R(s,s*,t)_K(s)	 (2.23)
Revenues do not necessarily rise with the level of quality chosen for a given tariff as in
the previous case. For s ^ %s* marginal revenues are positive for all levels of 1. For
s> s * and 1 relatively small or zero the derivative can become negative, but at
s = 5M (t) it is positive for all I (see Appendix 2B for the derivatives). If the "cost
advantage" caused by the tariff is not very pronounced the local supplier's revenues
may fall for some range of s close to 5M (t), as price competition becomes fiercer. Due
to the cost advantage, marginal revenues are always positive at s = 5M (t) and larger
than marginal revenues at all other points on the curve for s <SM (t), however. Hence
the local firm has an incentive to locate its quality close to the competitor and "steal
his business" by undercutting his price (Jeanneret and Verdier, 1996).
The first and second order conditions for a maximum are, with a two times
differentiable cost function
8), s*,t)
_________ - K' (.) = 0	 (FOG)(5
MC
MB
and (2.24)
52 ?( s* ,
 I)
_________- K"() <0	 (SOC)
Lemma 2.la: A unique interior solution to this optimization problem exists, if
Lemma 2.1 holds.
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Proof: If Lemma 2.1 holds, it is straightforward to show that there is a unique interior
solution for all I E [o,,M[. QED.
Lemma 2. la states the sufficient conditions securing that the first and second order
conditions (2.24) are satisfied for s € [o, SM (t)[, as long as the Government chooses a
tariff levelt E [ø,1M[.
2.4.3.	 The Choice of Tariff
We show now that strategic interaction in prices does not change the results of
section 2.3.3. A tariff increase leads to quality improvement of the local firm's product
and both products remain on the market, if I E [o, 1M [ Hence the tariff also induces
technology transfer. The difference to the previous results will be that the government
can bring down the importer's price. Social welfare rises unambiguously as the local
quality improves and some of the importer's profits are skimmed.
Proposition 2.la: If both suppliers compete in prices, the optimal level of quality
chosen by the local supplier i increases in the tariff level I, as long as I E [o, 1M [
Proof: see Appendix 2B.
As the local producer increases her quality price competition between the two firms
becomes tougher. The tariff however, gives the local producer a cost advantage over
the importer so that she finds it profitable to undercut the importer's price and steal
some of his market.
Graphically, the local firm's profit maximization in the second stage of the game now
looks as follows for I <tM:
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Figure 2.2: The Optimal Supply of Quality with Endogenous p
Marginal Revenue and Cost
k(t=O)
At tariff level 1-0, the local firm chooses local quality .(t = 0). If the tariff of the
foreign good is 0<1 <1M, the firm improves the quality up to the higher level of
quality .(t > 0). At I = 1M, the firm chooses the quality level (1M) and squeezes
the importer out of the market. Thus, a higher price for the imported good protects
the local supplier and increases the incentives to raise the quality of the local good.
This holds, although the marginal revenue functions are not monotonously increasing.
The benevolent government will now decide, if the tariff-induced technology transfer
is welfare enhancing. Differentiating the welfare function (equation (2.14)) with
respect to 1 yields
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	!i=1.(9* 2 _9,2 )+11(29*..._29, . - L)_(9*	 89_L)
&	
2	 —0,p
	
Charge maizpkis of the low mme coal	 (225)59*
__(g*sa_p*)_...(_g*)
Charge uuwplar of the high mcome co,armnm n of tarif reiue.
The derivatives have ambiguous signs apart from the importer's price, which
obviously falls as a result of an increased tariff (-- <0, see Appendix 2C). The
government's market power drives down p , which has a positive effect on welfare.
In addition the local product's price rises by less due to tougher price competition.
Equation (2.25) can be simplified to
SW	 59**2 _92)___t_(9*_O )_-_(_9*)	 (2.26)---=.-(9
Proposition2.2a: If suppliers interact strategically in prices, for an initial level of t=O
the government has an incentive to raise tariffs, as it increases welfare.
Proof: See Appendix 2B.
This model has shown that there exists a tariff that induces technology transfer. If the
foreign firm engages in price competition, the social cost of the technology transfer in
terms of price increases for both products are, however, more limited than in the case
where the importer does not react in prices. In the case of price competition, there
exists a tariff that unambiguously increases welfare.
2.5.	 Conclusions
The industrial production in a less developed country is often of lower quality than in
a more advanced country. This makes consumers worse off and can hamper long run
development, because technological progress is slower. Technology transfer from
advanced firms can help to engender catch-up.
Technology transfer is said to be attracted by securing high levels of human capital
and good infrastructure, in order to offer fertile ground to foreign firms in the less
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developed local economy. While this is certainly very sound policy advice, it is
possibly not easy to finance in a relatively poor country. Thus import tariffs have been
suggested to generate technology transfers.
Technology transfer in the existent literature tends to lower the production cost in
industries with undifferentiated products. The present model considers the impact of
tariffs on the quality choice of the local firm, when the local and the imported
products are vertically differentiated, and the local industry produces the low-quality
product due to its disadvantageous initial conditions.
If products are vertically differentiated, and production cost are equal, the producer of
the low-quality good maximizes monopoly power and profits by differentiating the
product. The introduction of a tariff, however, increases the production cost of the
importer's products on the local market. This gives the local firm incentives to
increase its quality and steal some of the importer's business by undercutting import
prices. If technology transfer is connected with increasing fixed cost, a tariff policy of
the local government induces technology transfer and also increases social welfare in
most cases. The tariff policy is more effective in terms of welfare, if the importer
reacts in prices, because the tariff induces a reduction in the high-quality firm's price
in addition to the improvement of the local quality. The tariff should not be too high,
however, because that would turn the local supplier into a monopolist, which reduces
his incentives to improve quality.
This model determines the conditions under which technology transfer can be
induced. Given that a tariff policy is easily feasible, It might be an alternative way of
attracting technology and enhancing development.
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SR(s = o,s*,p*,t)K'(s=O)<
&
Vs*,Vp*,VI(ii)
Appendix 2A: Exogenousp*
Lemma 2.1: A unique interior solution to the optimization problem in (2.8) exists, if
the following sufficient conditions are satisfied:
(i)	 K(s) is increasing and continuously differentiable in s.
(iii) K'(sM(t))>	
&
	 Vt <1M Vs*Vp *
where tM is the solution of K1 (5M (t)) 
- 5f(sM(t)s*p*)
Sc
(iv)
521?(55*p*g)	
Vs*, Vp* ,
 Vt
Proof:
(i) As	 SR(s=O,s*,p*,t) is continuously differentiable, the marginal profit
&
S,r SRftznction - = - - K' (s) will also be continuously differentiable.
Sc &
(ii) This condition secures that profits rise initially.
(iii) 5M (t) defines the quality level at which the importer is squeezed out of the
market for any 1. It is decreasing in I. For all I <1M K is defined such that
&(sM(t)) <•
Sc
(iv) This condition secures uniqueness of the interior solution, if conditions (i)-(iii)
are satisfied.
QED.
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[2s(s *
81 [ p**
(2.29)
Proposition 2.2: For an initial level of 1 0 the government has an incentive to raise
the tariff level t, as it is welfare enhancing if
2s(s-s)
->	 >081	 p*s* (2.18)
Proof: For an initial tariff level of 1=0 welfare rises in t if
j9*2 _92)_(9*+9,)>o	 (2.27)
81 2	 I
For (2.27) to hold, it is sufficient that (see Appendix 2C for 	 > 0)
[p*(3s*_2s) p*loj S	 (2.28)
---->0
[ 2s*(s*_s) 2s*j81 25*
with (9*+9,)= p*_	 1*(35*_2• (2.28)isthecaseif
.	 2s*(s*_s)
QED.
60
Appendix 2B: Endogenousp*
If suppliers interact strategically in prices, marginal revenues are not necessarily
increasing in the quality level. For a given tariff marginal revenues are
t 2s*	 ___(4ss)3 [s*2 (45*_7s)+2(45*+s)+	
s)2 
(4*2 +ss*_252 )] fors<SM(1
(2.30)
For s ^ 4 s * marginal revenues are positive for all levels of 1. For s> 44 s * and t
relatively small the derivative can become negative. Marginal revenues are, however,
always positive at s = 5M (1). The marginal revenue function at s = 5M (t) follows a
functionf(1)
________ -
1(1)—	
-
*2 [(4s * _75M (1)) + 4(4s * 5M (t))(s * _5M (1)) 4 * (4*2 5M (1)s * _25M (t)2)]+
(4 * _5M (1))2 L	 (2s _sM (1))	 (2s * _5M (t))2
(2.31)
f(t) is positive for all I E [0, Os*]. The first derivative of the function f(t) first rises
and then falls in 5M (1). f(I) takes the values 92/4 for s = 0 and
2/3 for s = s, remaining positive in that range. f(l) builds the frontier between
the cases where the local producer supplies the market together with the importer and
where she is the only supplier. It shows that marginal revenue at s = 5M (I) is always
larger than at s 0.
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Proposition 2.la: If both suppliers compete in prices, the optimal level of quality
chosen by the local supplier .1 increases in the tariff level t, as long as t E Lo, ?' [.
Proof: For Proposition 2.1 a to hold it needs to be the case that
&_ SE/5z_ _______________
— —
	 >0	 (2.32)
SI - SEISs - 8 2R 2 ( . , s* , t)/8s2 —K"(.)
where E is first order condition of the local producer's optimization problem
(condition (2.24)). This is the case if:
(i) The numerator of equation (2.32) is positive. Marginal revenue rises with the
level of tariff adopted by the government as long as the importer does not get
squeezed out of the market
4s*2 +s*s_2s21
1>0 for s'.zsM (t) (2.33)
- (4s * —s)3 [2(4s * +s) +21	 (s * _)2	 j
Hence, the local producer's incentives to improve local quality increase with a
tariff, as long as the tariff does not drive the importer out of the market.
(ii) The denominator of equation (2.32) is negative. This is second order condition
for a maximum of the local producer's optimization problem (condition (2.24)).
Lemma 2.1 a secures that the second order condition is always satisfied.
Hence as long as the importer is not squeezed out of the market (t E [o, 1M [), local
quality rises with the tariff level. QED.
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Proposition 2.2a: If suppliers interact strategically in prices, for an initial level of 1=0
the government has an incentive to raise tariffs, as it increases welfare.
Proof: Welfare increases in tariff level for 1=0
=(e*_e,)[4(e*+e )_l__(e_e*)&
= -[ (3s * —2s) - (4*2 —8ss * 2) + 125 * 2 1	 s	 2(2s * —s)
L 2(4s*_s)	 (4*_)2	 (4s*_s)2]8t (4s*_s) + (*) (2.34)
- 0s*(28s*+5s)+(4S*_3S)>O Vs,s*
- 2(4s*_s) St
where
(9* +9, ) = p * A + = O(3s * —2s)
s-	 I	 (4s*_s)
___	 205*(9*9, )=	 and(9_9*)=(4s * —s)	 (4s * —s)
QED.
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Appendix 2C: The Impact of a Tariff on Prices
In the case of exogenous import prices the price, of the local product increases with
the tariff level (given that 	 > 0)
(2.35)
St 2s*St 2s'
In the case of strategic interaction, the price of the local product increases with the
tariff level (given that	 0) in most cases
!. [(4s *2 _8ss*+s2)+4s*t]S	 S	 (2.36)
Si	 (4s*2 _)2	 St (4s*_s)
The importer's price obviously falls with the tariff level as by assumption 0 <1 <9*
— 2s*(t_3s*9)& (2s*_s) 
<0	 (2.37)St — (4s*2 _)2 St (4s * —s)
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3. Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern
Europe: Do Mainly Small Firms Invest?
3.1.	 Introduction
The structure of German firms' foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) reveals the spatial aspect of FDI: German small firms' investment takes
place more than proportionally in CEE. Large German firms, on the other hand, show
relatively little interest in CEE (Hartel et al., 1995); Notwithstanding that big firms
invest more in CEE than small firms in absolute terms. Large firms, however, have a
higher propensity to invest in general (Dunning, 1993).
In this chapter, we will argue theoretically and empirically, that CEE represents an
interesting production location mainly for such firms that have not yet invested
abroad, and are located close by. This implies (1) that many small German firms, that
have never invested abroad before, do invest in CEE; (2) that some firms would have
invested in CEE under perfect foresight, but do not now, because they have already
invested in other regions of the world. (3) The biggest firms invest in both the
classical investment locations and in CEE.
This approach explains why FDI in CEE has lagged behind expectations so far. In
addition, it implies that the economic integration at the borders between transition
countries and Western Europe must be booming. This has consequences in terms of
labor markets, technology spillovers and growth. Comparable developments might be
taking place in the South of the United States after the creation of NAFTA.
In the second part of the chapter, the model is presented. CEE has several features,
that we have modeled: for many German firms CEE is located in their direct
neighborhood. This should reduce the transaction cost (monitoring, coordination,
collection of experience and information) of FDI considerably (Hoesch, 1996). CEE
also offers lower production cost paired with considerable risk (Lankes and Stern,
1998). Moreover, we can safely assume, that CEE was not considered as a production
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location before, and that the opening of CEE came as a surprise to all firms (German
and others). Section 3.3 presents the results that will be tested. The empirical test of
the model in sections 3.4 and 3.5 is based on a survey of 2065 German firms in the
industrial sector. The survey only contains information about production locations.
There is no information about the project's purpose (horizontal versus vertical FDI).v
We conclude in section 3.6 with some remarks about possible future research on this
topic.
3.2.	 The Model
The theoretical literature on FDI is based on the confrontation of fixed cost of
production (concentration) and transport cost (Jroximity) (Brainard, 1993, and
Markusen, 1995). We adopt this approach and add firms size and distance. The
different FDI behavior of large firms and small firms is modeled in a world where
transport cost depend on distance as well as on the amount transported (iceberg cost).
While trading with the rest of the world, firms collect information and experience
about possible production locations elsewhere. Cost and return on FDI depend on the
cost structure of the firm as well as on distance between the firm and the investment
location. In addition, we introduce an unexpected time lag of appearance of
production locations. The Model can lead to the following structure of FDI:
1. The further away the investment location, the larger is the average investing
firm.
2. If an investment opportunity arises ,,close b' and unexpectedly after all firms
have taken their investment decisions, firms, that have not invested previously,
might be attracted by this new opportunity due to its proximity. Moreover,
some of the previous investments will be suboptimal under perfect foresight.
Given, however, that production locations cannot be shifted without cost, the
new production location will receive less investments than should be expected.
3.3.	 Assumptions
Assumption 3.1: The world consists of an infinite line starting at point 0. Initially,
there are only two production locations on the line, one in 0 (the main land) and the
27 See Markusen et al. (1996) for a definition of horizontal and vertical FDI.
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other in 1. Later, another production location (the vulcano) appears in location a
(0<a<1). Prior to investing, firms need to collect information and experience about a
production location.
Figure 3.1: Geography
First Investment
Main Land
	
Vulcano	 Possibility
I	 I	 I
0	 a	 1
	 Distance
Assumption 3.2: There is a large number of firms n. Each firm I produces at
constant marginal cost C1 E[Cmm,Cm1, where Cmm >0. The firms with lower marginal
cost are assumed to be the bigger firms 28 All firms function as local monopolies on all
points on the line.
Assumption 3.3: The transport cost per unit and distance traveled are Si, where S
is the distance traveled.
Assumption 3.4: Consumers are located along the infinite line and have unit demand
per period. Their reservation price is 6, for 6> Cm, •30
In an oligopolistic Cournot market, like there could be on the main land, a firm with smaller
constant marginal cost would cover a larger part of the market.
E.g., they sell different products, travel at different times, or along a different line.
3° The finns face Bertrand competition at each point: the indigenous unit cost of production is
(O+e). Thus the locals buy one unit per penod from the firms at a price 0, paying with natural
resources (e.g. gold), they posses.
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Firm fs profit per unit sold is (e - c, - ôt), where 9 is the price of one unit of goods.
The profit margin decreases with unit production cost and distance traveled.
Lemma 3.1: The maximized profit per period of a firm producing only in location 0
(without any investment) is
,.noInvest 
= A1 = f(0-c1 -&)d8=b 2t	 (3.1)
0
for j = 1,2,3 periods and 4 
=
Proof: The firm sells until marginal return equals marginal cost at 4 
=
With this form of transport cost, firms with lower marginal cost of production
maintain positive marginal profits for a longer distance on the line, implying also
higher total profits.
Assumption 3.5: There are three periods in time. Firms have perfect foresight about
everything apart from the appearance of the Vulcano a.
Period 1. Firms are born with knowledge about location 0. They produce in
location 0, ship and sell their products and collect experience and
information.
Period 2. Some firms invest in location 1. After investment in location 1 has taken
place, location a appears unexpectedly. All firms produce, ship, sell and
collect information and experience. 31
Period 3. Some firms invest in location a. All firms produce, ship and sell.
Assumption 3.6: Investing abroad (in locations 1 and a) creates fixed cost. These
fixed cost consist of two components:
31 With an infinite time horizon, the story could, for instance, be that location a will appear with
certainty, but in every period the probability of appearance is the same. Over an infinite time horizon
that reduces the probability of appearance of a in each period to zero.
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IE! k
 +FAk =+(k—S,)2t+ktit	 FA=kt
5 <k
S ^ k
(3.4)
(i) The cost of information and experience E17, where (k = a, i)
E1
	 5, <k	
(3.2)
otherwise
(ii) The fixed cost of building the factory in location k32
FAk 3kt	 (3.3)
Given 5, 
=	
, the total cost of foreign investment in location k are
An investment abroad requires knowledge about the local situation: this may include
information about the legal system, the language as well as the culture, the market,
other firms etc. If a firm sells its products somewhere, it at the same time collects
experience and information necessary to set up production facilities there. Otherwise
it somehow has to pay for information and experience.33
The cost of investment are rising in k and in C,. The further away the investment
location, and the higher marginal cost of production, the higher are the cost of
collecting experience and information about these locations. A positive externality
arises here, because lower marginal cost not only generate higher per unit profit, but
they also reduce this component of the fixed cost of foreign direct investment.
32 The number 3/8 was chosen for expositional simplicity. See Appendix 3E for the more general
model where the cost of setting up the factoiy also vaiy.
It is assumed here that information and experience are highly firm specific, so that they cannot
easily be bought from another firm.
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Graphically profits and cost of information and experience are represented here:
Figure 3.2: Profits and Cost of Investment in Location 1 in Period 1
1	 (O-Cj-6t)
3.4.	 Results
3.4.1.	 Intertemporal Profit Maximization when only Location 1 Exists
In period 1, firms maximize their profit over all three periods, not taking into account
the arrival of location a in period 2. For certain firms it is worth incurring fixed cost of
investment in period 1 in order to set up a factory in location 1. The investment
enables them to sell out of locations 0 and I in periods 2 and 3.
An investment in location 1 increases marginal profit in two ways: on the one hand, it
extends the market, as the investing firm can now reach up to 1 + 4 on the line. This
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effect is equivalent to the typical market effect of FDI in Markusen Ct al. (1996). On
the other hand, the production site in location 1 reduces transport cost for some areas
that were already served from the main land. Thus, trade in periods 2 and 3 generates
additional profits for these areas on the line. This is a proximity argument of FDI
(Brainard, 1993). There is, however, no factor cost difference in the classical sense to
motivate FDI in this model.
In this framework, the larger 4, the more important becomes the proximity advantage
over the market reach advantage of an investment in location 1. In addition, the cost
of information and experience are inversely related to 4 (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Profits after Investment in Periods 2 and 3
0	 1
reduced cost
new market
Proposition 3.1: In the beginning of period 2 all firms with 4 > -} invest in location
1.
Proof: see Appendix 3A.
This first result corresponds to the stylized fact that mainly large firms invest abroad.
In addition, they also become bigger by doing so.
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3.4.2.	 The Zero Probability Event: Production Location in a
In period 3, each firm can consider to invest in location a. The cost of investing there
are lower than for location 1. Time left to sell, however, is also shorter, namely, only
period 334 The investment decision taken in period 1 about location 1 diversifies the
firms' interest in investing in location a. Firms that have already invested in location 1
only benefit in terms of transport cost from investing in location a, whereas firms that
only produce on the main land can reach a larger market when investing in location a.
(Big) Firms that have invested in location 1 are from now on called F (=. ^ f),
the others (small) are F0 (=	 <f).
3.4.2.a.	 The Gain of Investing in Location a for Type-O-Firms
Adapting their profit maximization to the change of situation at the end of period 1,
type-O-firms compare net profits without investment in location a, H"	 to
profits minus cost of investing, 	 a for the remaining two periods. 1 invest in
location a, if	 a > JoJnvita Small firms face a similar optimization problem for
location a as they did in period 1 for location 1. If 	 <a, they have to pay extra
cost of information and experience in order to invest in location a.
Proposition 3.2: F realize additional profits from investing in location a, only if
0 <a <45 - , implying a <5o The gains from investing in location a are
G
a - kweita - nolsrv.zta +ra
o_ 0 0
Proof. see Appendix 3B.
A relatively high 5 is necessary to make an investment in location a profitable, so
that only a small proportion of F -firms invest there. The total amount sold, as well as
Period 3 could also stand for the remaining future until infinity discounted at a given discount rate
r, where r is positive and smaller than unity as usual. In that case, profits of period 3 would have to
be divided by r. This would as expected increase their value, but it would not change the fundamental
results of the model. Thus for the sake of mathematical simplicity we have ignored the intertemporal
discount rate for periods 2 and 3 and the future.
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marginal profit depend positively on 4 . If 4 becomes too small, gains fall short of
the fixed cost of investment.
3.4.2.b.	 The Gain of Investing in Location a for Type-i-Firms
For 1 investment in location a does not impose any extra cost of information and
experience. The firm travels along the new land anyhow. But there is no market
coverage gain connected with investing in location a. All increases in profits due to
investment in a are driven by transport cost reduction. F-firms invest in a, if
a > flhIaIrnwst a
Proposition 3.3: Independently of the size of , 1 invest in location a, if a <3..
The additional profit from investing in location a are G1° = 1TE"
Proof: see Appendix 3C.
Only if the new investment location is close enough to the main land, can relatively
high marginal gains from investing exceed relatively low cost of setting up a factory.
3.4.2.c.	 The Structure of Investment in a
By comparing the two gain functions G and G' and the cost of investment, the
structure of investment in location a can be derived.
Proposition 3.4: There are three possible outcomes depending on the distance of
location a from the main land:
(1)	 F invest in location a (G' > C;'), if a <3. All small firms, for which
4 >3.a+ (G >C°), alsoinvestthere.
(ii) No F invest in location a (G' ^ C'), if a > 3.. All small firms, for which
4 >3- a + (G0° >C'),doinvestthere.
(iii) None of the firms invest in location a (G' ^ Ci") and (G' ^ C), if a ^ 4,.
Proof: Follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.3. QED.
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Figure 3.4: The Structure of Investment in Location a
If location a appears close to the main land, the cost of investment are low and the
marginal gain from saving transport cost is high for the large firms. Thus they invest in
the new location. Only a portion of the small firms invest there: only for the bigger
small firms the gain exceeds the cost of investment.
If a erupts not so close to the main land, but still far from location 1, the large firms
do not invest. A portion of bigger Fo-firms, however, does invest.
3.4.3.	 The Firms, that Would Have Invested in Location a
Had location a existed in period 1, some of the firms that have invested in location 1,
might have preferred to invested in location a (only).
Proposition 3.5: If location a already exists in period 1, some of the F 1
 ( > f) will
find it more profitable to invest in location a than in location 1. A F 1-firm would have
invested in location in period 1, if
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IO8j
FWOUld have
hvested in a
0.6	 0.7 0.8	 0.9	 d1
J(1) (25, - + J5(5 2 - +	 a ^ 5,	 (3.5)a>
	(2) 35_il	 a>5,i	 $
Proof: see Appendix 3D.
The area, in which F 1-firms would have invested in location a, in the a, 6-space looks
like this:
Figure 3.5: F1-Firms, that would have Invested in Location a
The model predicts that the further away location a is located (becoming a better
substitute to location 1), the more F 1-firms would have invested there. For any
possible location of a at least some medium sized F 1-firms would have invested there,
had the location existed before. Those firms do, however, not invest there in period 2,
because they have already invested in location 1 and shifting production locations is
very costly.
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35.	 Results to be Tested
If Central and Eastern Europe can be compared with an eruption of ^ a <, then
we should observe (1) that small firms are relatively more attracted by CEE as
production location than big firms and (2) that having already invested somewhere in
the world dissuades some medium sized firms from investing in CEE.
3.6.	 The Data
The empirical analysis is done with survey data from the Ifo Investionstest of spring
1995, containing information for the year 1994. The Investitionstest is a six-monthly
survey of Western German firms in the industrial sector. The survey contains 2065
observations and covers about 47% of total investment and 36% of total employment
in the industrial sector. The purpose of the survey is to estimate and evaluate
investment of the Western German industry. In spring 1995, a short question about
firms investments abroad was added to the survey. It was asked, where in the world
firms have production facilities.35
As the actual purpose of the survey is to draw conclusions about investment in
Western Germany, large firms are oversampled in the survey. For the hypothesis of
this paper this is unfortunate, because it reduces the variation in the group of small
firms in the regressions, and the unweighted data underestimates the importance of
SMFs activities in CEE.36
The average size of investing firms in the survey is larger than that of non-investing
firms and increases with the distance of the investment location and the number of
projects (see Table 3.4 in Appendix 3F). In addition, the above mentioned stylized
facts are repeated in this survey: only 3% of the small and 8% of the medium sized
" We do know neither how much capital was invested, nor how many projects a finn has per
country. It can be assumed that larger firms invest more capital per project. The amount of capital
invested might, however, be a blurry indicator of the economic impact of the project, as production
locations abroad are often locally financed or joint ventured. Moreover, strategic alliances with very
little or no capital involved can have similar effects and are not at all included in this survey.
SME's activity is most probably also underestimated in this survey because SMEs tend to use
strategic alliances more extensively than bigger firms (Kaufmann et al., 1990).
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firms (SME) have production locations outside Germany. 37 The share of investing
SMFs, that produce in CEE, however, is very high (62% and 43%, respectively).
Large firms have, as was to be expected, a much higher tendency to produce abroad,
but their investment activities in CEE are relatively less pronounced than those of the
SMFs (see Table 3.1 in Appendix 3F).
Figure 3.6 shows that the rate of investing only in CEE decreases with the size of the
investing firms, whereas the rate of investing in far-off regions (Africa, Americas, Asia
and Australia) increases with size. The rate of investment in Western Europe looks
similar. The rate of investing in CEE (including also firms that invest elsewhere),
however, first falls with size, parallel to the rate of investing only in CEE, but then
slightly picks up again. Possibly a large share of small firms would not have invested
outside Germany at all, if CEE had not erupted. The kink in the rate of investment in
CEE could stand for the fact that having invested somewhere else dissuades medium
sized firms from investing in CEE as well.
Size is always in terms of employment (and logs of employment) of 1994 in Germany. Alternatives
would have been turnover or investment in Germany. All three of them are veiy highly correlated
(all correlation coefficients were above 0.87).
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Figure 3.6: Investment Rates in CEE and in Far-OfT Regions by Size
o RATECEE1	 RATECEE2
o RATEFAR	 RATEEU
1
.8
.6
.4
.2
SIZE
Ifo Investitionstest and own calculations
RATEFAR is the rate of investment in far-off regions (Americas, Africa and South
East Asia), RATECEE1 is the rate of investment in CEE, RATECEE2 is the rate of
investment only in CEE, and RATEEU is the rate of investment in Western Europe.
Even the unweighted data shows that already in 1994 CEE was an important
investment location for German industrial firms. 38
 Only Western Europe attracted a
higher share of firms' investment. Almost half of the firms, that invest in CEE, invest
only there. For the other regions of the world apart from Western Europe that number
is much smaller (see Table 3.3 in Appendix 3F). When weighting the survey results
with the actual firm size distribution in the German industiy, the economic importance
of CEE for SME's becomes clear: 70% of all German firms investing in production
locations in CEE are SME's. Weighted in terms of number of projects in CEE, about
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50% of all German industry's investment in production locations in CEE are done by
SME's (see Table 3.2 in Appendix 3F). Kaufmann and Menke (1997) estimated for
the year 1996 that as much as three quarters of German projects in CEE come from
SMEs.
3.7.	 Regression Results
The following regressions will serve to further support our first very simple empirical
results. In a first step, we are going to illustrate the significance of size when it comes
to investing in production locations outside Germany. Then we will look at the
subgroup of firms that have invested in CEE. Although size plays a less obvious role
for members of the subgroup, the effect of having already invested somewhere else on
the probability of investing in a production location in CEE is clearly negative.
3.7.1.	 Binomial Logit
First, we estimate the probability of setting up a production location outside Germany
given size and sector of the firm. Then we estimate the probability of investing in CEE
in the subsample of all investing firms. For this purpose we estimate a Logit Model
(Greene, 1993, Chapter 21) with the Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure. We
define a set of dummies:
PL1=1 ffirm i has a production location in Ic, and PL1=O ffirm i does not
produce there.
k stands for
. Production locations outside Germany
. Production Locations in CEE
. Production locations in far-off regions (Aflica, Americas, Australia and Asia)
. Production locations in Western Europe
. Production locations far-off regions and in Western Europe
In the survey of 1995, studied here, 7% of all firms had production locations in CEE (see Table 3.3
in Appendix 3F), according to the same survey a year earlier 14% of Gennan industrial firms
invested in CEE in production and distribution (Hoesch and Lehmann, 1994).
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PL1 =1 if
fliWWJSk+EJk^HOIflY3k+cJIOJflWJtk	 (3.6)
If the disturbances (C,foIm k -	 k) are standardized to follow a logistic
distribution with E(...) = 0 and V(...) = 1, and A represents the cumulative
distribution, then the probability of investing in location k is
jq- nolim'.zl k	 Inv.st k	 g Io1uw.k gP(PL1 th =l)=(e,	 -C,	 )<(fJJnVUtk_fl	 ]
(3.7)
=A[(H"	 _flnoJnwJfk)]
The model predicts that net profits of investment in location k depend on firm specific
variables such as size and whether investment has already taken place elsewhere, and
on location specific variables such as the distance and the production cost. As
mentioned before, the available data contains little information about both of these
categories of variables, but it still fits the assumptions of the model quite well.
In a first regression, we estimated the probability of having a production location
outside Germany with the entire sample (see Table 3.7 in Appendix 3F). The
regression confirms that size of firms drives investment abroad. Even within the
sectors the bigger firms tend to invest abroad.39
Then the probability of investing in CEE was estimated in the subsample of investing
firms. For this purpose we assume that most of the investments in CEE in the data
have taken place after most of the investments in the other regions of the world. This
seems plausible, because the survey contains the stock of investment locations in the
world up to 1994. Most probably, only very few of the investments outside CEE were
made in the time period between 1990 and 1994, when almost all of the investment in
CEE must have taken place.
Simply size in different specifications, when controlling for sectors, does not explain
investment in CEE very well. If production locations in other regions of the world are
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included as explanatory variables (they are lagged by assumption) these as well as size
turn significant, and the general significance of the estimates rises considerably (see
Table 3.7 in Appendix 3F). It looks as Wit is not necessarily the small investing firms,
that locate in CEE, but that those which have not invested in other regions of the
world tend to invest in CEE with a higher probability.
3.7.2.	 Multinomial Logit
In order to test the robustness of our first results, two multinomial Logit were
estimated. For that purpose we define PL2 1 in the following way:
PL2 =0 if firms I has no production locations
• PL21=1 if firm i has a production location only in CEE
PL2 =2 if firm I has production locations in CEE and elsewhere
PL2 =3 if firms I has production locations everywhere but in CEE
If PL2 1=0, the profits of that choice has to be larger than those of all other choices for
firms I. The same has to be true respectively for the other cases. If the disturbances
can be standardized to follow a logistic distribution with E(...) = 0 and V(...) = 1, a
multinomial Logit can be estimated (Maddala, 1983, Chapter 2). Two types of
probabilities were estimated. One with the entire sample and one only with the
subsample of 411 investing firms. Results are reported in Table 3.8 in Appendix 3F.
Apart from the reasonable fit of the data, the results of multinomial Logits are difficult
to interpret. For that reason we have simulated the regression results for the default
sector (as only a few sectors have single significance) and all possible sizes in Figure
3.11 and 3.12 in Appendix 3F.
Both pictures tell a slightly different story from the binomial Logit regressions: when
all observations are considered, it becomes clear that investment takes place mainly
with the big firms. When only the investing firms are considered, the small investing
firms go to CEE only, the big investing firms do both. For the medium sized firms,
Table 3.5 shows that the size varies within the sectors, even if the size distribution across sectors
clearly also varies.
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however, all three options are equally weighted. In this size category the decision
seems to depend on other missing variables.
3.8.	 Conclusions
Small German firms have few production locations outside Germany, but if they
invest, it tends to be only in one location and with a high probability in CEE. Thus
CEE seems to offer locational advantages such as proximity and cost advantages to
these firms that classical investment locations do not have. Big firms tend to have
production locations further away, and in many places including also CEE as part of a
multinational corporate strategy. For medium sized firms, however, other factors
seem to play a role. In the model presented here, the fact that a firm has already
invested somewhere else, can keep it from investing in a new location. We find
empirical support for these theoretical findings in the binomial Logit regressions. In
addition, the degree of globalization of the firms that is not picked up by size or the
sectors might drive some medium sized firms to invest in all regions of the world.
Furthermore, we find that the weight of SMIE's investment in CEE is substantial. In
1994 only four years after the opening of these countries, up to 50% of the German
industry's investments in production locations in CEE came from SMEs,
notwithstanding that the typical small firm activities are strategic alliances and
distribution investments rather than production investments. The results corroborate
that proximity plays a role in the investment decisions of especially the small firms.
Further research should focus on the implications for local labor markets and growth
of the regions concerned with of integration of CEE. So far there is little information
about the character of the investments, as well as about the strategic alliances in these
regions. We cannot say at this point whether jobs are exported, or whether integration
increases international competitiveness of these regions, so that jobs are actually
protected and growth is created.
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(3.10)
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Appendix 3A: Investment in Location 1
Proposition 3.1: In the beginning of period 2 all firms with 4	 invest in location
1.
Proof: If firm i does not invest in location 1, its profits over the three periods are
(equation (3.1))
fl,OInuS =
	
r°	 = 34	 (3.8)
If firm i invests in location 1, it receives ,r'' = A, - C, in period 1. In periods 2 and
Jnv.st3, respectively, firm i receives	 = 34 if 4 ^ -i-, or n 23 = A, + 2B, if 4 >
Where
1
=
	 (3.9)
Thus profits after investment in location 1 are
A,—C+3A, +3A, =7A,—C:
3	 h..d	 _
FI1,IWZt =	 =	 p.nodI	 penod2 penod3
A,—c:^2B+A,+2B,-I-A,=3A,+4B,—C:
p.nodl	 pvwd2	 p.rtod3
Firm I invests in location 1, if the incremental profit from investing in location 1 is
positive.
>H'°'
	 (3.11)
If 4 ^f, (3.11) implies
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74—C,' >34
44 > c' =
242t>(1-5,)2t+t (3.12)
This inequality only holds for 4 > -. Thus, it is nt profitable for these firms to invest
in location 1.
1f4 >-}, (3.11) implies
34+4B1 —C,' >3A,=
4B, >C=	 (3.13)
2(5, —)t >	
'<Si
These inequalities are satisfied for all 4 > - Thus, these firms invest in location 1.
QED.
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0 <a ^ 2S
(3.15)
2.5 <a
Appendix 3B: Small Firm Investment in Location a
Proposition 3.2: i realize additional profits from investing in location a, only if
0 <a <45) - , implying a <5g . The gains from investing in location a are
a = TTJmP(Jt 
a - H ° '	 + C: .''0
Proof: If firms do not invest, profits are as expected in period I
3
1T 11O Ii,w,,t a =	 'pa !,,w a11 0 	 0/	 =2A0
j=2
(3.14)
If a firm does invest, there are three different profit functions depending on the
location of a. The further a is located, the higher are the cost and the higher are the
gains in terms of new markets, but the lower in terms of reduced transport cost, if a
erupts beyond 5, the firm faces cost of information and experience, if a erupts
beyond 2 , the gains in terms of market size are exhausted, but the cost in terms of
experience and information continue to rise. Profits from investing in a are
IA —C°^2D0^A010	 0
3	 Ii-iIr,v.sZ a - 	 if Iflvezt a 	Psnod2	 P.no43
0	 -
j=2	 IAo—+3Ao
Penod2	 P,nod3
where
D, =J(O_c, —5)d5 
=-1(a5 —.a2)I
	 (3.16)
Graphically, the three cases of investment of a small firm in location a can be
represented in the following way:
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a12	 a'
IO<a<pI
0 <a ^ 25
2S <a
Figure 3.7: Small Firm Profits after Investment in Location a
It is profitable for firms 0 to invests in location a, if
flJrn.sa >Hnohnw3ta
a
I 25 <a I
(3.17)
(3.17) implies the following inequalities
2A0^2D çia' 12A0o	 — o I
	
4A—''°	 2A1o	 '—ol	 0
nr	 J	 L.nr-'l
=
2D0 'l IC:
	
0 <a ^ 25
	 (3.18)
2AOJ [c:	 25 <a
=
(1) (a8 
—+a2)t	 at
	 0 <a ^
(2) (a50 —+a 2 )t > +(a-80)2t+kat
	
<a ^ 25
(3) 8t	 4(a-50)2t+.at	 < a
(1): For a ^ ö, (3.17) implies
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(a4-+a2)i>jat
c
=:'
	 (3.19)
as 4 <f (Proposition 3.1), 45 - ^ 4 is true, so that inequality (3.19) can be
satisfied. Thus small firms invest in location a, if a <44 -
(2): For 4 <a ^ 24, (3.17) implies
(aS 
-+a2)t>+(a-S0)2t+at
	 (3.20)
It is clear from (3.19) that this inequality cannot hold for the range 4 <a ^ 24. Thus
these small firms do not invest in a.
(3): For 24 <a, (3.17) implies
=
a;
5t+(a4)2i>a1 (3.21)
We can show that this inequality does not hold either, by showing that
J<(a4_—a2 )t<F for 24 <a. From (3.19) we know that H<F for that range.
H
It remains to be shown that
51—+(a-5o)21 <(aS0 -+a2)t	 if 2S <a	 (3.22)
At a = 24, H> J and as the functions do not have another intersection after 24,
H> J is also true for all a> 24
Ha=25 = 
52g > f52g = j
	 (3.23)
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and for the range 26 <a, the slopes of both ftinctions are negative, one decreasing
faster than the other
OH
—=5 –1-a<O2
of
and - 
=o - a <0	 for 25 <a	 (3.24)âi
Thus J<H<F for 2S <a.
It has been shown that small firms in the range a> c do not invest in location a,
whereas small firms in the range a ^ 6 do invest there, if a <4 - . QED.
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Appendix 3C: Large Firms Investment in Location a
Proposition 3.3: Independently of the size of , 1 invest in location a, if a <.
The additional profit from investing in location a are G' = fl'	 - fl'° " + C1'.
Proof: For F1 -firms no investment in location a leads to
3
no Invest aJJnoInvesla	
=4B1+2A1	 (3.25)
j=2
F1 -firm profits when investing in a are the following
3
fllnvesso =	 ).Jnves1a 
=2B, +A, —C^2D, +2E1 +A1 	 (3.26)
j2	 Period2	 Period 3
where
I-a
E1 
= 1(9_cl — öt)dö= -[(1_a)	 (1_a)2]t	 (3.27)
Where the additional profits from investing in location a are (Figure 3.8)
G° =2(D1 --E1 —B1 )=fa(1—a)t	 (3.28)
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Firms 1 invests in location a, if
flhiw.aa >H°"'
	 (3.29)
(3.29) implies
2A1 + 2B1 + 2D1 + 2E1
 - C > 4B1 + 2A1
2(D1 + E1 - B1 ) > C°	 =	 (3.30)
-a(1—a)t >at
ci
This inequality is satisfied for all a < . QED.
For 1 the gain arises only from reduced transport cost. Additional profits do not
depend on , because as long as ^ j- the area that represents the additional profits
of investment in a only varies with a. A small a leads to a smaller gain but also
signifies a lower cost of investment. As a grows larger than cost rise above the
gain. This leads to the rather stark result that either all or none of the 1 invest in a.4°
4° In reality the veiy big firms invest in many locations and also in CEE (Lankes and Venables,
1996). This possibility is excluded here. Under the assuniption that the fixed cost of setting up the
factory vaiy across firms (e. g. according to sectors, see Hatzius, 1997), one could get a more
pluralistic result, where among equally sized firms behavior differs.
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(1) (25k
 - ) + J5(5 2 _J ± .z'1	 2	 64)
L2 38,
a ^ 8
a> c5	 (3.5)
Appendix 3D: The Firms, that Would Have Invested in Location a
If location a had existed already in period 1 (or had at least been expected to appear),
some firms that might have invested only there rather than only in location 1. The
reason being that the fixed cost of investment are lower there.
Proposition 3.5: If location a exists in period 1, some of the F 1 (t > -i-) will find it
more profitable to invest in location a than in location 1. A F i-firms invests in location
am period 1,if
Proof: A firm would have preferred to invest in location a in period 1, if
1F12t + 2a(5, —+a)t —tat
=1 821+2a(5, 
— +a)t--atIT
a^5
--(a-5,) 2 a> 5, (3.31)
where H" =.5,2t+2(5, _.)t—ft_4(1_8,)2 for+<5, <1 (equation (3.10)).
If ^ , the firms would not invest in location I in any case (Proposition 3.1). If
> 1, the firm would invest in location 1 in any case, as the gain is higher than the
extra cost.
+ 2a(8, - +a)t - at <5,2t + 2(5, - -)t -	 1<5,
a<45,-3	 isthecaseforl>a	 (3.32)
Thus, solving equation (3.31) for a gives equation (3.5). QED.
Figure 3.5 represents the area in the a, 5-space, where firms would have preferred to
invest in location a. For the large F 1-firms location a would never have been an
alternative to location 1.
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Appendix 3E: When the Fixed Cost of Investment Vary
The purpose of this appendix is to justi& the choice of parameters FA4 1 = -t, and to
show that FI4' = t is a special case of a more general model with variable cost of
setting up a production location. When these cost are allowed to vary results support
several investment structures in location a.
Proposition 3.6: We call 50M the cut-off between the F, and F1 -firms. The biggest
firm that does not invest in location 1 has 4 = 8O . We call x the coefficient of the
fixed cost of setting up a production location (so far x = j-). 50M is a function of x
and has the following form
+ .. x -
	 O^x^- =
sr= 3—iJ7-2x	 =: +<sr^1	 (3.33)
f<x	 = 1<s
There exist four different regions in the a, x-space (Figure 3.9):
(i) Some 1 and all F -firms invest if GZ > C. and G' > C10 . That is the case
ifaczf(x,S0M (x)) and a<1-2x.
(ii) Only I -firms invest if G ^ C6° and G' > C10. That is the case if
f(x,S0M(x))^a<1-2x.
(iii) Only some F, -firms invest if GZM.. > C. and G ^ C10. That is the case if
1 - 2x ^a <f(x,öM(x)).
(iv) No firms invest if G5 ^ C. and G1° ^ C10. That is the case if
a^f(x4Mx(x)) and a^1-2x.
Where GZ and C., are respectively the gain and the cost of investment in
location a of a 1-firm with 2M
Proof: Equation (3.33) follows from Appendix 3A when replacing = x. The
inequalities in Proposition 3.6 follow from Appendix 3B and equation (3.30) in
Appendix 3C, taking = x. QED.
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Figure 3.9 shows the four regions in the a, x-space:
Figure 3.9: The Structure of Investment when the Cost of Investment Vary
1--
Only
0.8
f' &_
-
0.4	 0.6	 0.8
	
I
x - Cost of Investment
Given the linear cost structure of the model, the fixed cost of investment (FA') have
to be relatively high in order to generate the case that small firms invest in location a
and large firms do not invest there. Decreasing cost make more firms invest in
location I in period 2 and increase the incentives to invest in more than one location.
Thus, low cost leads to the case that both categories of firms invest in location a, if it
is not to far-off, or that only F, -firms invest there, if a is further away. The intuition
seems clear: the larger the cost of investing the more firms remain local producers
initially. These firms are then attracted by location a, as investment there is relatively
cheap and their return still interesting. For the firms, that have already invested further
away, however, the cost of yet another investment in location a exceeds the return. If
the cost are very high, no firm invests in location a. For expositional simplicity we
have chosen the special case of FA' such that 4M =
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Table 3.2: Investment Structure in CEE Weighted by Employment of 1994
less than	 50-199	 200-999	 1000 or	 Total
50	 employees employees	 more
___________________ employees __________ __________ employees __________
Total employment in 	 615.1	 1479.6	 2123.1	 2014.2	 6263.0
industry in 1994 (in
1000 persons)	 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________
of which is covered by
	
2%	 5%	 15%	 92%	 36%
theIfo-Investionstest ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
weighted investment	 37%	 33%	 25%	 5%
structure in CEE in
termsof firms	 _________ _________ _________ _________ _________
weighted investment	 24%	 25%	 35%	 17%
structure in CEE in
termsof projects	 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________
ho Investitionstest 1995 and own calculations
Table 3.3: Investment Locations in the World
% of total sample % of all 	 Only in:
_____________________________ _________________ investing firms __________
Production facilities abroad	 20%	 100% __________
In CEE (CR, H, P and SK) 	 7%	 35%	 16%
In other Ex-Communist countries4 '	 2%	 12%	 3%
In Western Europe	 13%	 63%	 21%
In USA and Canada
	
6%	 31%	 5%
In East Asia	 6%	 29%	 4%
South and Middle America	 4%	 20%	 1%
In Africa and the Rest	 1%	 2% __________
ho Investitionstest and own calculations
' The other Ex-Communist countries, where firms had invested, were: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Kasachstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Russia ad Ukraine. They were not included in
the CEE-group, because they are geographically further away from Germany.
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Table 3.4: Average Number of Employees of Investing and Non-Investing Firms
Average size of firms (employees) 	 in no. Of prs.
All	 1091
Not
 investing	 551
Investing	 3264
Investing only in CEE	 1188
Investing only in Western Europe 	 1153
Investing in at least two Regions	 4552
Investing in CEE	 3673
Investing in Western Europe	 3755
Investing far-off and not in CEE 	 4250
Investing far-off and in CEE	 8090
Ifo Investitionstest and own calculations
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Figure 3.10: The Sectoral Distribution of Investment
• RATEINV
	
• RATECEE
ifo Investitionstest and own calculations
Where RATEINV is the rate of investing to not investing firms and RATECEE is the
rate of firms investing in CEE to all other firms.
Table 3.6: Correlation Coefficients
___________________________ (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)
PLin:	 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
(1) CEE (dum.)	 1	 ______ ______ ______ ______
(2) Far-Off (dum.)	 -0.26 1	 ______ ______ _____
(3) W. Europe (dum.) -0.32 0.05	 1	 ______ ______
(4) (2) and(3) (dum.) -0.16 0.69	 0.54	 1	 _____
(5) Size (log of empl.) 	 -0.05	 0.37	 -0.32	 0.40	 1
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Outside	 in CEE	 In CEE	 in CEE
Germany
0.7 (15.0)*	 -0.0 (0.06)	 -0.7 (-1.56) 0.24 (2.32)*
-	
-	 0.1 (1.58)	 -
-	 3.4(_7.00)*
-	 3.3 (-7,91)
-	 3.3 (5.90)
0.3 (1.00)
0.2 (0.71)
-0.7 (1.97)*
0.2 (0.71)
04(1.53)
0.7 (2.65)*
0.1 (0.29)
0.9 (3.11)*
0.9 (2.37)*
0.1 (0.22)
1.24 (4.40)*
-0.3 (-0.70)
-6.2 (16.0)*
-0.6 (-1.03)
0.15 (0.24)
-0.7 (-1.07)
-0.1 (-0.09)
-0.2 (-0.41)
-1.7 (_3.46)*
0.3 (0.06)
-0.1 (-0.18)
0.3 (0.62)
-0.2 (-0.30)
0.2 (0.49)
0.1 (0.64)
-0.2 (0.63)
-0.6 (-1.14) -0.4(-0.43)
0.1 (0.15) -0.2 (-0.21)
-0.7 (-1.05) -0.4 (-0.44)
-0.1 (-0.12)	 0.2 (0.30)
-0.2 (-0.35)	 0.0 (0.03)
-1.7 (_3.40)* 1.1 (_1.86)**
-0.2 (-0.25) 0.2 (0.22)
-0.1 (-0.22) 0.5 (0.89)
0.2 (0.34) 1.3 (1.75)**
-0.2 (-0.32) 0.6 (0.67)
0.2 (0.45)	 0.1 (0.14)
0.2 (0.24)	 0.8 (1.13)
1.9 (1.27)	 0.5 (0.64)
2065
	
411
	
411
	
411
-802.50	 -248.80	 -247.53	 -193.88
0.22
	 0.07
	
0.07
	
0.27
Significant	 Significant	 Significant Significant
Table 3.7: Binomial Logit Estimates of Investment in the World and in CEE
Endogenous variable: production location (PL):
Exogenous variables42
Size (log Employment)
Size2
PL in far-off locations
PL in Western Europe
PL in far-off and Western Europe
Sectoral dummies:
Chemicals
Timber
Paper, Printing & Publishing
Rubber Man Made Fibers
Metal Articles
Mechanical Engineering
Motor Vehicles
Electrical Engineering
Precision Engineering, Optics, Etc.
Ceramics, Glass, Musical Instr., Etc.
Textile, Leather & Clothing
Food, Drink & Tobacco
Constant
Diagnostics:
Number of observatiors
LogL
Pseudo R2
Joined significance of sectors (at 5%)
' The default sector is Mining, the sector with the lowest investment rate. Test statistics are given in brackets.
* for significant at 5% level, ** for significance at 10% level.
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Exogenous variables
Size (log Employment)
Sectoral Dummies:
Table 3.8: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Investment in the World and in CEE
Endogenous variable: production location (PL):
Only in in CEE and Not in CEE Only in In CEE and
CEE	 elsewhere	 CEE	 elsewhere
0.5 (4.53)	 1.0 (9.97)*	 0.8 (13.1)* 0.4 (_3.39)* 0.3 (2.80)*
Chemicals	 -0.5 (-0.72)
Timber	 0.1 (0.20)
Paper, Printing, Etc.	 -1.8 (2.28)*
Rubber Man Mad -0.1 (-0.12)
Fibers
Metal Articles	 0.0 (0.01)
Mechanical Engineering -1.2 (-2. 04)*
Motor Vehicles 	 0.0 (0.03)
Electrical Engineering	 -0.5 (-0.77)
Prec. Engineering, Etc. -0.7 (-0.70)
Ceramics, Glass, Etc.	 -1.3 (-1.21)
Textile, Leather, Etc. 	 1.1 (2.65)*
Food, Drink & Tobacco -1.2 (-1.53)
Constant	 -5.3 (_8.18)*
	
0.8 (1.04)	 0.6 (1.39) -1.0 (-1.30) 0.1 (-1.5)
	
0.1 (0.09)	 0.2 (0.51) -0.1 (-0.15) -0.1 (-0.09)
-0.2(-0.19) -0.4(-0.92) -1.0(-1.10) -10. (-0.11)
	
0.9 (1.01)	 0.3 (0.69) -.0.3 (-0.50) 0.5 (0.51)
0.9 (1.22)	 0.6 (1.58) -0.3 (-0.60) 0.2 (0.26)
0.5 (0.65)	 1.2 (3.75)* 2.3 (_3.44)* -0.8 (-1.06)
0.7 (0.86)	 0.1 (0.20) -0.2 (-0.23) -0.5 (-0.59)
2.2 (3.22)*	 1.0 (2.85)* 1.6 (_2.18)* 1.1 (1.52)
2 . 6(3 .44)*	 0.9(1.80) -1.9(-1.60) 1.7(2.04)
1.3 (1.59)	 0.2 (0.43) -1.6 (-1.41) 1.3 (0.88)
1.8 (2.54)*	 1.2 (3.29)* -0.1 (-0.11) 0.6 (0.82)
1.1 (1.40)	 -0.3 (-0.57) -0.9 (0.96) 1.3 (-1.50)
-10.6 (_10.0)* -7.1 (_14.8)* 2.0 (2.36)* -3.8 (_3.67)*
Diagnostics:
Number of observations
Comparison group
LogL
Pseudo R2
Joined sign. of sector
(at 5%)
2065
No PL outside Germany
-1120.95
0.20
Significant
411
NoPLInCEE
-317.15
0.14
Significant
43The default sector is Mining, The sector with the lowest investment rate. Test statistics are given in brackets.
* for significant at 5% level, ** for significance at 10% level.
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Figure 3.11: The Estimated Probability of Investment in CEE with respect to Size (all
Observations)
1,2.
Figure 3.12: The Estimated Probability of Investment in CEE with respect to Size
(Investing Firms)
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ERRATA
Chapter 1
Page 21: The example on Page 21 should be transformed to a footnote (13a). The
relevant passage starts at the top of the page ("There is no brain drain...") and ends
with "... with productive human capital" on that page. This case describes an
example without brain drain, and is therefore not directly relevant to the paper.
Chapter 2
Pages 41 and 46: In the present form, the model only considers the profit
maximization of a foreign investor who repatriates profits. The surplus of a licensor
or a consultant would differ from Expression (2.8), because profits before technology
transfer are not considered.
80*	 50	 59* 59Page 51: It can easily be verified that
	 >0, -i-> 0 and - - _!> 0 in
Expression (2.16) are positive (from Proposition 2.1 we know that
	 >0):
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Chapter 3
Page 67: Figure 3.1 should be
Figure 3.1: Geography
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Page 69: Equation (3.2) should be
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